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Because tort law is designed to insure compensation for
harm, not adequate child support, tort law leaves children born
as a result of tortious conduct inadequately protected. The
problems and complexities associated with proof of harm in
wrongful life and wrongful birth actions cause courts to signifi-
cantly limit the recovery of compensatory damages. These limi-
tations threaten to leave many families without the resources
necessary to adequately provide for their children. To protect
these children, lawmakers need to abandon their exclusive reli-
ance on tort doctrine as it is traditionally construed.
Traditional tort law embraces an unduly narrow notion of
corrective justice that fails to resolve wrongful life disputes satis-
factorily. The unique circumstances associated with the creation
of a new life bring into play another, broader paradigm of
responsibility: one that resembles family law more than tort.
From this perspective, children whose birth can be attributed to
tortious conduct have a strong moral claim for supplemental
child support whenever a tortfeasor's interference with the pro-
creative rights of the parents foreseeably results in the birth of a
child and that child's parents cannot provide adequate support.
In such an instance, the tortfeasor's misconduct has irreversibly
changed the status quo. A child has been born, and that child
needs support. This fact materially distinguishes the conse-
quences of this tort from other "harmless" negligence and justi-
fies an obligation to contribute to the child's support.
Contrary to the assumption of courts that have decided the
claims of children born due to tortious conduct, the obligation of
tortfeasors to contribute to the support of the resulting children
need not depend entirely on proof that the tortfeasor has
398 [Vol. 67
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"harmed" the child by causing a life so bleak that life itself is
harmful. This traditional tort requirement may be appropriate
for resolution of the child's claim for tort damages, but the child
should not be asked to make this showing if the claim is instead
for child support. Unlike tort damages, child support awards are
not intended to compensate for harm. Rather, they are intended
to protect the child's welfare by fairly apportioning support
responsibility among the responsible adults.
As long as courts overlook the unique location of these
cases at the juncture of tort and family law, the children's claims
will not be properly evaluated. Negligence that results in the
birth of a child raises issues that are central to both fields. It
raises tort law concerns because the child's claim turns on proof
that the defendant's conduct is careless or antisocial in a sense
ordinarily regulated by tort law. At the same time, it raises
traditional family law issues because it results in the birth of a
child, which generates concerns about the adequacy of that
child's support. Neither field, standing alone, can provide the
tools necessary for full and fair resolution of the resulting claims.
Unless a doctrinal bridge is built between the two fields,
these cases are destined for incomplete consideration. As negli-
gence cases, they seem to have no place in family law. As tort
cases, on the other hand, their child support components are
unwelcome. As long as we feel obliged to compartmentalize
these claims into one field or the other, cases of negligently
induced birth are destined to be handled inappropriately.
A blending of the two doctrines is necessary to provide
these children with adequate and just protection. For this task,
lawmakers will have to bridge the boundary between family law
and tort. The resulting cause of action for backup or secondary
child support should be a hybrid of tort and family law in which
tort law defines the duty and family law the remedy. Carefully
fashioned, it would result in a fairer and more subtle reconcilia-
tion of the rights and responsibilities of all the parties than
existing tort law standing alone.
Without question, an action for backup child support would
require an extension of existing legal doctrine. The normative
basis for the claim is, however, powerful enough to justify re-
examination of the doctrinal barriers. Although a boundary
crossing of this sort has no direct analogies in family law or in
tort, each field provides some important raw materials for build-
ing the necessary bridge. Indeed, courts that prefer to use famil-
1992] 399
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iar doctrines could provide some of the same protections for
these children by extending existing tort rules governing wrong-
ful birth, rescue duties, or the calculation of damages. But these
approaches have problems that make direct acknowledgment of
a new tort-based action for child support superior.
Doctrinal and methodological barriers have hindered
explicit consideration of a tort-based child support claim by
either courts or scholars. Once a court characterizes a child's
claim as a tort claim, the relevance of family law notions of
financial responsibility and child welfare are overlooked. Even
the few courts that allowed recovery by children born as a result
of tortious conduct insisted on analyzing the claims exclusively
as torts. Because these courts permitted partial recovery with-
out proof that the children had been "harmed" by birth, they
were destined to be harshly criticized as inconsistent with the
tort rules used to decide them. Regrettably, but understandably,
the judges deciding these cases did not articulate a noncompen-
satory rationale to support their intuitive sense of corrective
justice.
Because the possibility of a nontort rationale for a wrongful
life remedy has gone unmentioned, no court has thoroughly ana-
lyzed the merits of a claim for child support. This Article is
intended to begin that discussion.
I. WRONGFUL LIFE DOCTRINE
The tort claims of children born as a result of tortious con-
duct have fared poorly in the courts. As every first-year law stu-
dent knows, these claims foundered on the requirement that the
plaintiffs prove some injury arising out of the defendant's con-
duct. In wrongful life cases, proof of injury requires a compari-
son between the child's current condition and the state that
would have existed if no tort had been committed (nonexis-
tence). No court has been willing to allow the factfinder to make
this comparison between life and nonexistence. As a result, the
three courts that permitted some recovery without making this
comparison were characterized as unprincipled and result ori-
ented. Neither these courts nor their critics appreciated that the
relief allowed in those cases was better characterized as supple-
mental child support than as compensatory damages. Once the
claims were characterized as torts, courts and commentators
alike overlooked the claims's location at the border between tort
and family law. Consequently, the analysis of these cases has
400 [Vol. 67
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overemphasized the rights-based perspective of tort law and
slighted the care-based perspective of family law.
A. The Majority View
Tortious conduct can cause the existence of a child in a sur-
prising variety of ways. A physician, for example, may negli-
gently perform a sterilization; or a geneticist may negligently fail
to inform would-be parents that their future children are likely
to be born with birth defects. These scenarios are typical of
what have come to be called "wrongful life" cases. But these
examples of alleged medical malpractice by no means exhaust
the possibilities. In a recent Indiana case, for example, a mental
health institution failed to take adequate measures to prevent the
rape of one of its residents.' Tortiously induced childbirth could
also result from a reckless or intentional tort, such as a fraternity
brother "spiking" the fraternity punch bowl with drugs or an
obstetrician concealing information about genetic defects
because of his opposition to abortion.
For children who owe their lives to tortious conduct, the
only alternative to life in their current condition is to have never
existed at all. Under traditional causal analysis, they have been
harmed by the defendant's tort only if their lives are worse than
nonexistence.2 Not surprisingly, the difficulties presented by the
comparison between life and nonexistence have generated sub-
stantial judicial discomfort.
Most of these judicial misgivings can be loosely divided into
three categories: (1) concerns about the logical possibility that
being born can be harmful; (2) doubts about the capacity of
judges and jurors to apply the comparison between life and non-
1. Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 962, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1991).
2. This is the familiar "but for" test of causation of harm. E.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643
P.2d 954, 957 (Cal. 1982); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th lawyer's ed. 1984); Patrick J. Kelley, Wrongful Life, Wrongful
Birth, and Justice in Tort Law, 1979 WASH U. L.Q. 919, 935-36; see also, eg., Alexander
M. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 618, 657-60 (1979);
Derek Parfit, On Doing the Best for Our Children, in ETHics AND POPULATION 100, 101
(Michael D. Bayles ed., 1976); John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Lib-
erty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 987-1000
(1986); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy,
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 440 (1983).
3. The arguments against implementing this test are discussed at much greater length
in a previous article. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Protecting the Unconceived: Nonexistence,
Avoidability and Reproductive Technology, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 487, 497-510 (1989).
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existence in individual cases4 in order to ascertain injury5 or cal-
culate damages;6 and (3) fear that a tort action premised on the
idea that being born with birth defects can be worse than never
existing at all would impugn the sanctity of life. In my view,
these objections are overstated.8 But no court-not even the
three permitting recovery-has allowed the plaintiff the oppor-
tunity to prove that life under the circumstances was a net detri-
ment. Absent that proof, most courts felt compelled to deny
recovery. 9
B. The Minority View
The courts that allowed recovery faced a doctrinal
4. E.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227
A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1976) ("By asserting that he should not have been born, the infant
plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a court to measure his alleged damages. .. "),
overruled by Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d
807, 812 (N.Y. 1978); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924-25 (Tex. 1984); see also
Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the
Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1444-
50.
5. E.g., Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692; Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 296
N.Y.S.2d 41, 44-45 (App. Div. 1968), modified, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div. 1970), aff'd,
283 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 1972); see Bonnie Steinbock, The Logical Case for "Wrongful Life, "
HASTINGS CENTER REP., April 1986, at 15, 17-18; G. Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for
"Wrongful Life," 1 ISR. L. REv. 513, 529 (1966). For a further discussion of this conten-
tion, see Peters, supra note 3, at 498-501.
6. E.g., Turpin, 643 P.2d at 964; Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (Idaho 1984);
Goldberg v. Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530, 534-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), aff'd in part, 499 N.E.2d
406 (Ill. 1986) (affirming the wrongful birth, rejecting the wrongful life claim, and allowing
the parents to replead the claim of emotional distress); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d
635, 640-41 (Kan. 1986); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496 (Wash. 1983).
7. Eg., Blake, 698 P.2d at 322; Bruggeman, 718 P.2d at 639-40; Azzolino v.
Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986). For a
further discussion of this contention see Peters, supra note 3, at 501-09.
8. See Peters, supra note 3, at 497-509.
9. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 544 (D. S.C. 1980); Gildiner v.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Smith v. United
States, 392 F. Supp. 654, 655-56 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 547-
49 (Ala. 1978); Di Natale v. Lieberman, 409 So. 2d 512, 513-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Blake, 698 P.2d at 321-
22; Goldberg, 471 N.E.2d at 534-35; Bruggeman, 718 P.2d at 637-42; Strohmaier v. Associ-
ates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 332 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Gleitman,
227 A.2d at 691-94; Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 473 N.E.2d 244, 245-46
(N.Y. 1984); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811-14 (N.Y. 1978); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1970); Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 533, 537;
Rubin v. Hamot Medical Ctr., 478 A.2d 869, 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Nelson v. Krusen,
678 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Tex. 1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 879-83 (W. Va.
1985); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 375-76 (wis. 1975).
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dilemma.10 They, too, were troubled by the comparison between
life and nonexistence. Yet, they were convinced of the fairness
of providing lifelong assistance for children born with congenital
disabilities. To mediate this conflict, the three courts permitting
disabled children to recover formulated an apparent compro-
mise. On one hand, they permitted recovery without proof that
the children's lives were harmful.11 On the other hand, they lim-
ited that recovery to the extraordinary expenses associated with
the children's birth defects.1 2 The practical result was to assure
the availability of financial resources, as Roger Dworkin has
observed, "regardless of what becomes of the parents and even
after the child reaches adulthood."1 3
These cases were immediately criticized as internally incon-
sistent. Both advocates1 4 and critics15 of recovery were dis-
10. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 961-64; Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760-64 (N.J. 1984);
Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 494-97. In addition to these courts, Louisiana and Massachusetts
have recently left open the possibility of an action by a disabled child. See Pitre v. Opelou-
sas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (La. 1988) ("Logic and sound policy require a
recognition of a legal duty to a child not yet conceived but foreseeably harmed by the
negligent delivery of health care services to the child's parents."); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551
N.E.2d 8, 13 (Mass. 1990) ("We do not totally discount the possibility that we might
impose liability for the extraordinary expenses of caring for a person like Adam after his
parents' deaths, perhaps in order to keep such a person from being a public charge.").
11. One of the courts conceded it was not requiring proof that nonexistence would be
preferable. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 763 ("not premised on the concept that non-life is prefer-
able to an impaired life"); cf. Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 480 N.E.2d 1227, 1235
(I11. App. Ct. 1985) ("not a question of evaluating impaired existence vis-a-vis existence"),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987). In another ease, the child had
congenital deafness-a condition unlikely to make life a net detriment. See Turpin, 643
P.2d 945 (allowing special damages for the extraordinary expenses attributable to congeni-
tal deafness).
12. Each denied general damages for pain and suffering. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 964;
Procanik, 478 A.2d at 764; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496-97. The singular exception is found
in the opinion of the California Court of Appeals in Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477, 498-90 (Ct. App. 1980). In Curlender, the court permitted general damages,
thereby necessitating the use of a test of overall harm. Curlender was overruled by Turpin.
13. Roger B. Dworkin, The New Genetics, [1989] 1 Biolaw 89, 108 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Procanik, 478 A.2d at 771 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty, supra note 2, at 988
n.169; see also Nora K. Bell & Barry M. Loewer, What Is Wrong with "Wrongful Life"
Cases, 10 J. MED. & PHIL. 127, 136-41 (1985); Barry R. Furrow, Diminished Lives and
Malpractice: Courts Stalled in Transition, 10 LAW MED. & HEALTHCARE 100, 103 (1982).
15. See, e.g., Turpin, 643 P.2d at 966-67 (Mosk, J., dissenting); Siemieniec, 512
N.E.2d at 700-01; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 772 (Schreiber, J., dissenting in part); Nelson v.
Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925, 930-31 (Tex. 1984); HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 17.1, at 245 n.48 (2d student ed. 1988);
Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty, supra note 2, at 989 n.170; see also
Hutton Brown et al., Project Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy
and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REv. 597, 757 (1986); Bruce L. Belton, Comment, Wrongful Life:
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pleased by the compromise. As Dworkin noted, "[i]t seems odd
to... admit simultaneously that an injury has been inflicted on
the child while denying full compensation for it."'1 6 In the eyes
of Justice Robertson of the Texas Supreme Court, on the other
hand, courts allowing partial recovery had silently discarded the
requirement of "legally recognizable injury" in an effort to reach
the "right result."' 17 From either perspective, therefore, partial
recovery seemed an unprincipled and inexplicable compromise. 8
Melinda Roberts correctly pointed out that the remedy, if
viewed as one meant to compensate for net harm done to the
child, would overcompensate children with minor birth defects
whose lives are clearly beneficial while often undercompensating
those with the most catastrophic injuries.19 As a result, no state
supreme court since 1984 has joined this line of cases. During
the interim, three state supreme courts have overruled interme-
diate appellate court decisions that would have permitted
recovery.2°
The three courts that allowed disabled children to recover
extraordinary expenses did not explicitly defend the award of
monetary relief as a form of child support. Nevertheless, the
facts and language of the opinions permitting recovery are more
consistent with an award of child support than with an award of
compensatory damages. In each case, the court emphasized the
A Legislative Solution to Negligent Genetic Counseling, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 77, 98-100
(1983); Kurtis J. Kearly, Note, Turpin v. Sortini: Recognizing the Unsupportable Cause of
Action for Wrongful Life, 71 CALIF. L. Rlv. 1278, 1291-93 (1983).
16. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 98.
17. Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 930. The Supreme Court of Colorado made a similar
charge in Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Colo. 1988).
18. Dworkin views this result as a compromise reflecting the difficulty of deciding
whether the child has really been injured by "having life with a defect." DWORKIN, supra
note 13, at 98. As I read these cases, however, they do not limit recovery to close cases, nor
are they premised on a colorable claim of overall harm. As a result, I view them as more
consistent with an unstated obligation to help pro 'ide part of the child's support than with
a compensatory recovery for harm done.
19. Melinda A. Roberts, Distinguishing Wrongful from "Rightful"Life, J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'y 59, 70 (1990).
20. Continental Casualty Co. v. Empire Casualty Co., 713 P.2d 384 (Colo. Ct. App.
1985) (established right of impaired child to recover for wrongful life), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part en banc sub nom Empire Casualty v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764
P.2d 1191 (Colo. 1988), overruled by Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1210 n.10
(Colo. 1988); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 480 N.E.2d 1227 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
(child had cause of action to recover extraordinary expenses given that a child has a right
to be born whole), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 512 N.E.2d 691, 696-707 (Ill. 1987);
Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1991).
[Vol. 67
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tortfeasor's causal responsibility for the child's needs, not the
presence or absence of harm. This is consistent with a child sup-
port perspective, but not with a tort perspective.
In Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., for example, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court said it preferred "to place the burden of
those costs on the party whose negligence was in fact a proxi-
mate cause of the child's continuing need for such special medi-
cal care and training. "21 Similarly, in Turpin v. Sortini, the
California Supreme Court observed that the defendant's negli-
gence had placed "a significant medical and financial burden on
the whole family unit" and emphasized the importance of these
expenses to the child's well-being.22 And in Procanik v. Cillo,
the New Jersey Supreme Court said that recovery is "not pre-
mised on the concept that non-life is preferable to an impaired
life, but is predicated on the needs of the living."'2 3 The court
continued, stating that "[w]e seek only to respond to the call of
the living for help in bearing the burden of their affliction." 24
Thus, "[tihe right to recover the often crushing burden of
extraordinary expenses visited by an act of medical malpractice
should not depend on the 'wholly fortuitous circumstance of
whether the parents are available to sue.' "25 As these quota-
tions illustrate, all three courts emphasized the needs of the chil-
dren and the defendants' duty to help insure that those needs
were met. Because this responsibility appears to arise out of the
defendant's responsibility for the life of the child, not proof of
"harm" to the child, it resembles a child support obligation
much more strongly than a tort liability.
Even more revealing is the language used in an intermediate
Indiana appellate court opinion (since vacated) that allowed
wrongful life recovery by a healthy child. In Cowe v. Forum
Group, Inc. ,26 a nursing home's negligent supervision of its men-
tally handicapped patients resulted in the rape of a profoundly
21. 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983).
22. 643 P.2d 954, 965 (Cal. 1982).
23. 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 762 (quoting Turpin, 643 P.2d at 965).
26. 541 N.E.2d 962, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 575
N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1991). But see, Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Ct. App. 1983)
(promiscuous patient in mental health facility gave birth to healthy child); Williams v.
State, 223 N.E.2d 343, 343-44 (N.Y. 1966) (child born to mentally deficient mother as a
result of sexual assault while institutionalized). Both Foy and Williams considered claims
for general compensatory damages, not claims for child support.
1992] 405
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retarded woman by another mentally ill patient. Jacob, the child
born as a result, was apparently healthy, but his parents were
unable to care for him. He was eventually placed for adoption.
After noting that Jacob would not benefit from any recovery
that his mother might receive in her own tort action against the
nursing home, the court allowed him to proceed with a claim for
"support" for the time between his birth and his adoption. 7
Like the three courts that allow recovery by disabled children,
the Cowe court declined to become engaged in a debate over the
harmfulness of the child's life. Instead, it predicated recovery
"on the needs of the living." '28 "Jacob was born alive," said the
court, "and lived a period of time without a parent to support
him. Forum's negligence was allegedly the proximate cause of
Jacob's situation. '2 9 This language, too, is more consistent with
an award of child support than one for tort damages.
In each of these cases, the court awarded only part of the
tort remedy sought. As long as the relief was characterized as
tort damages, it could be criticized as either inadequate or exces-
sive, depending on one's viewpoint, and as unprincipled, regard-
less of one's viewpoint. But the mystery surrounding this
unorthodox "compromise" disappears once the recovery is
viewed as a rough form of supplemental child support rather
than as compensatory damages. In each of these cases, the court
assumed that the child's needs were in danger of being unmet. If
these assumptions were correct, then supplemental support was
necessary to help with the child's extraordinary expenses. Thus
viewed, the defensibility of these holdings does not turn on proof
that the child's physical condition is so bleak that life itself
is harmful. Instead, it turns on a determination that the
tortfeasor's responsibility for the birth of the child justifies call-
ing on him to help with the child's support.
Regrettably, the courts granting recovery have not consid-
ered a child support rationale for their decisions. Only the Indi-
ana intermediate appellate court opinion in Cowe characterized
the relief awarded as child support; even that court did not
explain why child support was an appropriate remedy for a tort-
based claim.30 In fact, the court dismissed Jacob's separate
27. Cowe, 541 N.E.2d at 965.
28. Id. at 966.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 965, 967.
406 [Vol. 67
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claim for "imputed paternity" without recognizing the relevance
of family law to its decision.
Perhaps the closest a court has come to explicitly stating a
rationale more consistent with child support than tort damages
occurred in a recent Massachusetts case. In Viccaro v. Milun-
sky, 3 1 the court dismissed a disabled boy's claim for extraordi-
nary damages on the grounds that these damages could already
be recovered by his parents. But the court reserved for future
consideration the possibility of a cause of action for any expenses
that could not be claimed by the parents. Said the court, "[w]e
do not totally discount the possibility that we might impose lia-
bility for the extraordinary expenses of caring for a person like
Adam after his parents' death, perhaps in order to keep such a
person from being a public charge."'32
Until the courts appreciate that the rationale for partial
recovery lies outside the boundaries of tort law, they will remain
vulnerable to criticism that their holdings are unprincipled. A
noncompensatory remedy needs a noncompensatory rationale.
Until a noncompensatory rationale is articulated, the harm
requirement will continue to serve as a doctrinal obstacle to rec-
ognition of the children's claims in most states. Furthermore, in
states that permit recovery without a noncompensatory ration-
ale, the relief awarded will be incorrectly calculated. An award
of all extraordinary child-rearing expenses has the potential to
be excessive whenever parental resources are adequate to pro-
vide the necessary support and inadequate whenever parents
lack resources for even ordinary support costs. 33 Explicit recog-
nition of a child support rationale would remedy these problems.
C. Barriers to Consideration of a Child Support Claim
No state high court has yet seriously considered a child sup-
port rationale for recovery. Indeed, lawyers rarely plead it, even
as a secondary cause of action.3 4 The absence of any serious dis-
cussion suggests that the way lawyers, judges, and scholars think
31. 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990).
32. Id. at 13.
33. For a further discussion of the appropriate limits on recovery, see infra text
accompanying notes 57-68.
34. An alternative claim for child support would seem to provide an attractive
fallback theory in the event that the wrongful life claim is rejected or the factfinder con-
cludes that the defendant has caused the child no harm. Likewise, a child support count
would seem attractive in states that have already rejected wrongful life tort actions alto-
gether. A rare exception occurred in Cowe, 541 N.E.2d at 965-67; see also Foy v. Green-
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about this corner of law has obscured this potential claim alto-
gether. Even the courts permitting recovery have not realized
that their innovative holdings could be more persuasively
defended if they looked beyond the traditional tort paradigm for
support.
Alternative rationales for relief may have been overlooked
because the initial wrongful life cases were tried, briefed, and
decided as traditional tort cases. Once these claims were cast as
tort actions, a chorus of courts, counsel, and commentators
struggled with the genuinely difficult issues that surrounded
their prosecution as tort claims. In pursuing these questions,
nearly all parties have taken the doctrinal boundaries of existing
tort law as given. Once they assumed that proof of harm was
necessary to recovery, the rejection of these claims understanda-
bly became a matter of "logic" and "principle." From a tort
perspective, sympathy for the needs of the children represented
precisely the kind of emotionalism believed likely to bias the
courts and to deflect them from their task of pronouncing objec-
tive rules and applying them neutrally.
These blinders are best illustrated by a comment made by
the New Jersey Supreme Court. Even though this court had
decided to allow the recovery of extraordinary expenses, it could
not square its holding with the "logic" of traditional tort doc-
trine. "Law is more than an exercise in logic," said the court,
"and logical analysis, although essential to a system of ordered
justice, should not become an instrument of injustice. ' 3 But
that court's intuitions were no less logical than the harm require-
ment that it had abandoned. The problem faced by the New
Jersey Supreme Court was not the absence of a logical basis for
recovery, but the court's inability to look outside of tort law for
its rationale. A similar narrowness of vision was demonstrated
by the Indiana intermediate appellate court in Cowe. That court
dismissed Jacob's imputed paternity claim without appreciating
that its decision to award child support had indeed made the
institutional defendant an imputed parent for support
purposes.36
Exclusive reliance on tort law has led to a mistaken
assumption that relief would be inappropriate in the absence of
blott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Ct. App. 1983) (childcare sought but not separately discussed by
the court).
35. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984).
36. See Cowe, 541 N.E.2d at 965-67.
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proven harm to the child. Although the harm requirement pro-
vides a serviceable benchmark for claims seeking compensatory
damages, it is not an essential element of a claim for child sup-
port. Under current family law, child support obligations may
also arise out of genetic parenthood, contract, consent and some
kinds of tort-like misconduct.37 It would be a serious mistake,
therefore, to make the harm or no-harm dichotomy the litmus
test for all child support claims by tortiously conceived children.
Of course, wrongful life claims might not have fared any
better if they had been initially labeled as claims for child sup-
port. Certainly, some judges have made pejorative comments
about parental wrongful birth actions which indicate that they
would be unreceptive to any theory that makes the tortfeasor
into more of a "surrogate parent" than current law allows.38
Yet the absence of any serious judicial discussion of an
independent support action casts doubt on the likelihood that
the courts have actually given this possibility any extended
consideration.
Perhaps the width of the chasm between tort and family
law provides an explanation for the blinders. The two doctrines
emphasize two very different perspectives about human respon-
sibility. Although generalizations of this kind are always over-
broad, it is fair to say that tort law has traditionally endorsed a
relatively individualistic view of human responsibility. Tort law
emphasizes traditional Millsian freedom of action, authorizing
recovery when one individual has harmed another and denying
it in most instances when the defendant has merely failed to help
another person in need. This may be changing, but slowly and
with considerable resistance.3 9 Later, I will suggest that tort law
has some components that are consistent with an obligation to
provide backup child support, 4 but these components lie at the
fringes of tort territory, not at its core. By contrast, family law
deals with circumstances that emphasize the interdependence of
individuals and the reciprocal responsibilities which arise as a
result of this interdependence. The very different perspectives
associated with tort and family law may have made it especially
37. For a discussion of family law doctrines that are consistent with backup child
support, see infra text accompanying notes 83-93.
38. See, e.g., Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 823-24 (Fla. 1984); Reick v. Medi-
cal Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (Wis. 1974).
39. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 76-108 (1991).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 94-115.
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difficult to see the family law issues in wrongful life cases and to
build the necessary bridge between the two fields.
The difference in orientation between family law and tort
doctrine resembles Carol Gilligan's differentiation between
rights- and care-based reasoning.41 The liberal tradition of indi-
vidualism that tort law strongly reflects has been described as a
product of rights-based thinking.42 Family law, by comparison,
is more concerned with interdependence, relationships, responsi-
bility, and adequate care. These values are associated with a
care-based perspective.43 Gilligan associates these "different
voices" with differences in the way men and women reason.44
Rights-based reasoning is more often the primary orientation of
men than of women.45 Although tort-based child support claims
do not present the issue of gender bias directly, our predilection
for analyzing these cases exclusively in tort terms certainly
forces us to ask whether the law governing wrongful life cases
adequately appreciates the care-based perspective.
As Martha Minow has observed, the point is not to find
"the new, true perspective; the point is to strive for impartiality
by admitting our partiality. '46 Just as maturity in an individual
requires a productive tension between the feminine ethos of care
and the masculine ethic of rights,47 so, too, a mature jurispru-
dential approach to the claims of these children must reconcile
competing perspectives without lapsing into categorical analysis.
The task is not to choose between rights and relationships but to
41. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 100, 160 (1982).
42. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of
the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 893-96 (1989).
Rights-based reasoning emphasizes abstract principles (like equality and justice) to resolve
moral problems and views people as independent and autonomous. GILLIGAN, supra note
41, at 18-23; Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re) Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass
Torts, Power and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 902-03; Leslie Bender, From Gender
Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT.
L. REV. 1, 16-17, 36-38 (1990).
43. See GILLIGAN, supra note 41, at 160.
44. Id. at 100.
45. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 42, at 893-95 (describing ways that law reflects the
dominance of the rights perspective and suggesting that it does so because men have had
the political power to privilege their views). However, other female writers note that the
empirical data does not appear to link these different voices with gender as strongly as was
previously believed. See Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV.
617, 624-25 (1990). Rhode also expresses concern that undue emphasis on this issue will
obscure the differences among women, universalize a difference that may be a product of
subordination, and reinforce dichotomous stereotypes about men and women. Id.
46. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 376 (1990).
47. Id. at 376 n.9 (citing GILLIGAN, supra note 41, at 151-74).
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consider anew whether the tortfeasor's responsibility for the
existence of the child supports an obligation to provide supple-
mental assistance and, if so, to fashion a remedy that best pro-
tects the child without unfairly burdening the defendant.
II. THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF THE CLAIM
Children who are born because of tortious conduct have a
strong moral claim against the wrongdoer for supplemental
child support if their natural parents are unable or unobliged to
provide adequate support themselves. Although tort law
already provides tortiously conceived children some protection
in jurisdictions that allow parents to recover child support
expenses in an action for wrongful birth, the law governing
wrongful birth places several limitations on parental recovery
that may leave the affected children inadequately protected. A
backup action for child support would help correct this deficit.
A. Fairness Between the Child and the Tortfeasor
The most compelling cases for imposing a child support
obligation have three important characteristics. First, and most
importantly, the defendant's conduct has foreseeably caused the
birth of a child. This unique consequence of the tortfeasor's mis-
conduct gives the tortfeasor a special causal and moral responsi-
bility for the welfare of the resulting child. In this important
respect, the defendant who causes a child's birth is unlike other
tortfeasors whose conduct causes no harm. It distinguishes the
wrongful life defendant from the careless school bus driver who
wanders over the center line, but returns before any harm is
done, or the babysitter who forgets to turn off the stove burner,
but discovers this error before the children injure themselves.
The bus driver and babysitter have engaged in harmless negli-
gence that, as a practical matter, has left the status quo as they
found it. Thus, they are not legally accountable. But when a
tortfeasor's negligence causes a new child to be born, the status
quo is gone forever. In its place, a new responsibility has been
created-the responsibility to care for the resulting child.
This change in status quo materially distinguishes the tor-
tiously induced birth cases from garden variety harmless torts.
And this difference provides a legitimate basis for questioning
our insistence on proof of harm before allowing any relief.
Although the harm or no-harm dichotomy is serviceable enough
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in ordinary contexts, it cannot account for a vital aspect of the
wrongful life cases-the creation of a life. In wrongful life cases,
the unique relationship between the tortfeasor and the child pro-
vides a basis for responsibility that cannot be adequately under-
stood within the confines of traditional tort, doctrine.
The tortfeasor's unique relationship with the child justifies a
legal obligation to the child as long as the birth of that child was
a foreseeable consequence of the tortfeasor's misconduct. Under
traditional tort analysis, of course, no duty of care would be
owed directly to the child unless the misconduct posed a foresee-
able risk of harm as well.48 But when the remedy is child sup-
port rather than compensatory relief, the test of duty must be
restated. 49 Now the salient question is whether the birth of the
child or, perhaps, the inadequacy of family resources, was a fore-
seeable consequence of the tort. If so,50 the tortfeasor's liability
for contribution toward the support of the resulting child raises
none of the fairness objections that might exist if the birth of the
child were not a foreseeable risk of the tortfeasor's carelessness.
The second factor justifying recovery is that the defendant's
tortious conduct has deprived the parents of their ability to con-
trol their own reproduction. This occurs, for example, when a
tortfeasor's carelessness deprives parents of the medical informa-
tion necessary to exercise their own judgment about bearing
children or when a pharmacist carelessly fills a contraceptive
prescription. It also occurs when a mental health facility negli-
gently permits the rape of a resident. 51 The more culpable or
antisocial the conduct, the stronger the case for depriving the
defendant of the ordinary insulation that third parties have tra-
48. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 281 & cmt. c (1965); see also Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d. 8, 13
(Mass. 1990) (questioning the existence of a duty to the child).
49. In family law, for example, child support obligations do not ordinarily turn on
proof that the child's life is harmful. See infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
50. This outcome has certainly been foreseeable in the kinds of actions that have
resulted in wrongful birth and wrongful life cases in the past. See, ag., Curlender v. Bio-
Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 479-81 (Ct. App. 1980) (genetic tests were improperly
administered and thus failed to disclose high probability of serious birth defects), overruled
by Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (tests failed to reveal that parents were
carriers of Tay-Sachs disease); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (N.J. 1984) (German
measles during first trimester); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Wash.
1983) (pregnant woman's ingestion of anticonvulsive drug to treat epilepsy).
51. See Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 962, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd
in part and vacated in part, 575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1991); Williams v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343
(N.Y. 1966); see also Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Ct. App. 1983) (negligent fail-
ure to provide birth control devices).
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ditionally enjoyed from child support obligations. Furthermore,
because their tortious conduct wrongfully deprives the parents
of control over their reproductive decision making, these
tortfeasors have forfeited their standing to suggest that parents
be exclusively responsible for support of the resulting child, or
that public assistance provide the necessary supplementation of
family resources.52 These defendants are materially different
from tortfeasors whose birth-inducing negligence does not
deprive the parents of control over the decision to bear a child.
As a result, the claim against a person who carelessly sterilizes a
parent is stronger than one against an electric utility whose
faulty maintenance leads to an electrical blackout and the ensu-
ing conception of many unplanned children.53 This interference
with parental control over reproduction justifies reallocating
some of the support liability from the parents to the tortfeasor.
Third, many of the families who raise children born as a
result of tortfeasor negligence will lack the resources necessary
to provide adequately for the child, especially if the child or the
parents are handicapped.54 Some families will have to deplete
52. Interference with parental decisionmaking will be easiest to recognize in cases
where the parents did not want any more children at all or where they wanted to use
medical technology to detect and abort a fetus with severe birth defects. In one category of
cases, however, the suitability of recovery is more problematic. These cases would involve
parents who want a child but undergo sterilization to avoid the birth of a disabled child. If
carelessness in the sterilization procedure leads to the birth of a healthy child, the parent's
ultimate goals will have been accomplished, notwithstanding their provider's negligence.
The case for tortfeasor liability seems weakest here. Because the violation of duty to the
parents has caused them no harm, they will not be able to collect damages and, for obvious
reasons, are unlikely to seek any. Nevertheless, a plausible case for backup child support
might be made on behalf of the child (rather than the parents) because a child is now alive
who would not have been born but for tortfeasor carelessness in implementing the parent's
final choice. Under these circumstances, backup liability in tort is arguably a more appro-
priate source of assistance than welfare or charity, but I have serious doubts. For a further
discussion of the choice between tortfeasor liability and public assistance, see infra text
accompanying and following note 134.
53. Years ago, there were rumors of a high birth rate in New York City nine months
after an electrical blackout. More recent reports suggest a similar result after the 1989 San
Francisco earthquake. Ned Zemanced & Lucy Howard, Lights Out, NEWSWEEK, July 16,
1990, at 8. Proximate cause is the doctrinal vehicle used in tort law to analyze the role of
intervening third-party conduct, like that of the parents here. As a general matter, the
modem trend is for courts to hold the primary defendant accountable so long as the inter-
vening conduct was foreseeable, even if it was culpable. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2,
§ 44. Even so, intentional sexual intercourse by parents after a blackout would almost
certainly be viewed as the kind of intervening conduct that cuts off the tort liability of the
primary defendant. See id. (discussing parental failure to protect a child from dangers set
in motion by others).
54. In 1980, the total cost of raising a child was estimated at between $100,000 and
$140,000. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING
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assets that are needed to meet less urgent, but vitally important,
needs of other family members. The less the family is able to
provide needed support, the stronger the child's claim against
the tortfeasor to supplement family resources."
It is hardly surprising that all three of the wrongful life
cases allowing recovery have included children born with con-
genital birth defects. In these cases, the children's support needs
were most likely to exhaust the resources of the family, espe-
cially if collateral sources of assistance were ignored. By
allowing disabled children to recover, but limiting their damages
to the extraordinary expenses associated with their disabilities,
the courts intuitively fashioned relief to meet the child's needs.
Together these three factors point toward a class of cases in
which the children are likely to have an especially powerful
claim for assistance. They will display the following elements:
(1) tortious interference with the procreative rights of the par-
ents; (2) the foreseeable birth of a child who would not other-
wise have been born; and (3) the inability of the legal parents to
provide adequately for the child's ordinary or extraordinary sup-
port needs without inequitable sacrifices by other family mem-
bers. Where these factors exist, backup support liability is
appropriate unless other policy objections outweigh the norma-
tive claim.
Whether and how much relief is provided in an individual
case would depend on the child's support needs and the ade-
quacy of parental resources. In cases like Turpin, for example,
courts would be obliged to inquire whether Joy Turpin's parents
could provide for her special needs, taking into account the par-
ent's resources and the parent's wrongful birth recovery from
the defendant. If their resources were sufficient to pay for some
SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 3 (1985). According to one account, the government pays
$73,000 a year for children who have been institutionalized because their parents were
unable or unwilling to care for them. Louis Aguilar, Helping Their Way off Welfare,
NEWSWEEK, May 7, 1990, at 70.
55. Similarly, the ease with which the tortfeasor can bear or distribute the cost of
support also influences the appropriate size of the support obligation. As the marginal
improvement in the welfare of the child from a larger award decreases and the marginal
sacrifice to the defendant increases, the case for a larger award weakens. A similar balanc-
ing process is used to calculate child support awards in more ordinary family situations. In
wrongful life cases, however, courts may wish to examine the potential burden on the
defendants as a class, rather than as individuals, and to consider this collective ability to
buy insurance or pass on the cost of liability. Otherwise, direct consideration of a defend-
ant's assets could encourage providers to reduce their insurance coverage, at least insofar as
it applies to wrongful life claims.
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or all of her extraordinary expenses, then her recovery would be
reduced accordingly. If, on the other hand, her parents were
unable to afford ordinary or basic support costs, then her recov-
ery would include her ordinary expenses also. Indeed, on the
right set of facts, even healthy children might recover ordinary
support expenses. As a result, explicit recognition of a child
support rationale would result in a fairer and more precisely tai-
lored remedy than is currently awarded in the three states that
allow an action for extraordinary expenses.
B. The Inadequacy of Parental Actions for Wrongful Birth
To the extent that any jurisdiction allows the parents to
recover either basic child-rearing expenses or extraordinary
expenses in their parental wrongful birth action, it has already
reassigned some child support obligations from the legal parents
to negligent third parties and, to this extent, has satisfied the
child's claim against the tortfeasor as well. Nevertheless, several
factors counsel against exclusive reliance on parental recovery in
wrongful birth actions.
First, a few states bar some kinds of wrongful birth suits
altogether, particularly those suits alleging that tortious conduct
deprived the parents of the opportunity to abort.5 6 In those
56. See, eg., Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557,
558, 563 (Ga. 1990) (parents not informed of prenatal test for Downs Syndrome); Szekeres
v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1078-79 (Nev. 1986) (birth of a healthy child). The courts in
North Carolina and Missouri suggested that they will not recognize actions based on an
allegation that the mother was deprived of the opportunity to abort.
(1) North Carolina: Compare Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C.
1985) (rejecting action by parents of child with Downs Syndrome who was born due to
postconception negligence), cert denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986) with Jackson v. Bumgardner,
347 S.E.2d 743, 748-49 (N.C. 1986) (wrongful pregnancy action allowed for preconception
negligence leading to birth of healthy child) and Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 852 F.2d 773,
775-76 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying North Carolina law, court allowed action by parents of a
disabled child for preconception negligence) (citing Jackson, 347 S.E. 2d at 748-49).
(2) Missouri: Compare Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 746 (Mo.) (no action for
postconception negligence which allegedly deprived mother of opportunity to abort), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 893 (1988) and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1990)
with Shelton v. St. Anthony's Medical Ctr., 781 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Mo. 1989) (established
liability for postconception negligence that deprived mother of opportunity to seek counsel-
ing before delivery) and Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (court
would have allowed an action for preconception negligence if it had not been barred by the
statute of limitations).
In addition, a number of states prohibit claims (1) based on negligent prevention of
abortion, eg., IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-11 (Burns 1986 &
Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130
(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1987); (2) based on the birth
of a child, regardless of impairment, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-2 (1987); and
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jurisdictions, no protection is afforded to the affected children.
Second, wrongful birth actions function only to resolve the
tort dispute between the adults, not to evaluate or enforce any
legitimate support obligations owed directly by the tortfeasor to
the child. As between the adults, most courts conclude either
that ordinary child-rearing expenses should not be recoverable,5 7
or that they should be reduced to reflect the benefits that the
parents receive from the child. 8 At least one state even offsets
these benefits against the extraordinary medical expenses associ-
ated with congenital birth defects.5 9  As a consequence, the
resulting awards are usually insufficient to assure adequate sup-
port of the child, especially if the child has serious medical
problems. Even when the awards are combined with family
resources, they may be insufficient to provide suitable support
without requiring undue sacrifices from other members of the
family.
In one especially poignant and illustrative Florida case, the
court denied ordinary support costs to a family that had two
children born with birth defects prior to the negligent perform-
ance of a vasectomy on the husband.6 0 As a result of the negli-
gence, two more children were born, one of them handicapped.
Because the husband was ill and unemployed, the entire family
was on welfare. This case is an extreme example, of course, but
less dramatic instances of inadequate wrongful birth recovery
are surely common.
Third, an independent support claim may be needed in cir-
(3) based on the birth of a healthy child, see ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (West
1990).
57. E.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 721-23 (Ala. 1982) (damages for
healthy child limited to actual expenses and injury associated with an unexpected preg-
nancy); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 1984) (special upbringing costs
associated with disabled child were allowed). These opinions may represent the majority,
at least in cases where the child is healthy. See Johnson v. University Hosp., 540 N.E.2d
1370, 1375 (Ohio 1989) (finding child-rearing costs too speculative to be recoverable);
James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 877-78 (W. Va. 1985) (same); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 2, at 372 & n.58. (majority of courts deny child support for a healthy child). But cf
Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Mass. 1990) (parents of a healthy child, born after sterili-
zation, could recover child-rearing expenses).
58. E.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294,
1298-1301 (Ariz. 1983); Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (Md. 1984); Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 170-71, 176 (Minn. 1977).
59. See Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 11-12 (Mass. 1990).
60. Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 1984); see also Mears v. Alhadeff,
451 N.Y.S.2d 133, 133-34 (App. Div. 1982) (rejecting claim of unwed mother on welfare
after unsuccessful abortion).
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cumstances where the parents have forfeited or waived their own
rights to recovery, because parents should not be permitted to
waive the child's rights. For example, parents who have surren-
dered the child for adoption will presumably lose their right to
sue for child support as part of their own wrongful birth recov-
ery.6" But the child who has been surrendered for adoption may
still need support assistance, at least if the child suffers from seri-
ous birth defects. For these disabled children, a portable cause
of action for the extraordinary expenses associated with the disa-
bility may help them obtain a propitious permanent placement
or fund suitable foster care.
Nor is it clear that the child's needs should be left unmet
merely because the parents were contributorily negligent 62 or
tardy in filing their claims.63 Parents could decline to sue for
many reasons, such as: (1) they live in a state that would force
them to disparage the child's value to avoid offset; (2) their state
presumes that the benefits of parenting equal the costs; (3) they
are unaware of the child's likely future medical needs; (4) they
had adequate resources or insurance to meet the child's needs at
the time of birth, but later suffer health or employment problems
that threaten the care of the child; or (5) they lack the knowl-
edge, mental capacity, or disposition to recognize and pursue
their legal rights. Current mainstream doctrine offers no protec-
tion to children in these families. These children would be better
protected with an action on their own behalf because the statute
of limitations would ordinarily be tolled during all or part of
their minority. 4 This would provide them with protection simi-
61. See Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 962, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd
in part and vacated in part, 575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 199 1) (allowing recovery of preplacement
child support, but denying recovery to child for period after adoption); compare Rinard v.
Biczak, 441 N.W.2d 441, 444 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (grandparents who adopted their
minor daughter's healthy child could not "adopt a cause of action," because benefits of
raising a child outweigh child-rearing costs) with Clapham v. Yanga, 300 N.W.2d 727, 734
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (permitting grandparents who had been named as guardians to bring
a wrongful birth action), appeal dismissed, 335 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1982).
62. See, e.g., Fassoulas, 450 So. 2d at 823 (parent's recovery reduced because of their
comparative fault in bearing a second disabled child following a negligent vasectomy).
63. See, e.g., Anderson v. Wagner, 378 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (parents'
claim barred by statute of limitations), aff'd, 402 N.E. 2d 560 (Ill. 1979); Procanik v. Cillo,
478 A.2d 755, 758 (N.J. 1984) (parents' failure to file allegedly due to malpractice by their
attorney; child allowed to sue on own behalf for extraordinary costs of birth defects);
Alquijay v. St. Luke's Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 473 N.E.2d 244, 244-45 (N.Y. 1984) (parents'
action barred and child's action for wrongful life rejected).
64. See Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762 (statute of limitations does not apply to infant
plaintiff; infant plaintiff may recover extraordinary expenses incurred during majority).
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lar to that given to children who seek support from a deficient
natural parent. In those cases, the child can ordinarily sue until
emancipation or majority. 5
There is an additional reason to consider a backup child
support action. Parental recovery is sometimes limited to
expenses incurred during the child's minority. 6 Presumably,
this limitation reflects the extent of the parents' legal support
obligations.67 In those states, children who will need support or
medical care beyond majority are unprotected by their parents'
cause of action. They need an independent cause of action for
postmajority support. Even in jurisdictions that permit parents
to recover postmajority support, the children may need an
independent cause of action if their period of dependency is
likely to extend beyond the lives of their parents. That is
because the parents' right to recover compensatory damages for
postmajority support is likely to be limited to the expenses they
will incur during their lifetimes.68 In addition, parental recovery
will remain insufficient to the extent that it is subject to reduc-
tion to reflect the joys of parenting.
For all these reasons, the parents' wrongful birth cause of
action currently offers insufficient protection to the resulting
children to justify total reliance on it.
C. Fairly Allocating Responsibilities Between the Parents and
the Defendant
Because each jurisdiction's wrongful birth doctrine already
purports to strike a balance between the support obligations of
the parents and those of the tortfeasor, a separate action for
child support may be perceived as unfairly disturbing the
existing equilibrium. However, a cause of action for backup
child support that merely supplements parental support obliga-
tions, but does not supplant them, will do no injustice as
between the tortfeasor and the parents.
The easiest cases for imposing secondary child support obli-
65. See infra note 77.
66. See, e.g., Arche v. United States Dep't of Army, 798 P.2d 477, 486 (Kan. 1990);
Bani-Esraili v. Lerman, 505 N.E.2d 947, 948 (N.Y. 1987).
67. See Bani-Esraili, 505 N.E.2d at 948 (statutory limit on support liability for post-
majority expenses). Some jurisdictions, by contrast, allow child support to run beyond a
parent's death. See CLARK, supra note 15, § 17.1, at 718-19.
68. See Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 852 F.2d 773, 778 (4th Cir. 1988) (recovery limited
to parental life expectancy); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 11, 13 (Mass. 1990)
(parental recovery apparently limited to expenses "they will incur" before death).
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gations on the tortfeasor will involve disabled children who seek
to recover expenses likely to be incurred after the legal support
responsibility of the parents has ended. These expenses could
include either postmajority expenses or expenses likely to be
incurred after the death of the parents. As long as the parents
lack standing to recover these sums on the child's behalf,
tortfeasor liability directly to the affected child would simply fill
a gap in existing law. It would not disturb any prior apportion-
ment of legal responsibility between the parents and the
tortfeasor. Instead, it would help ensure that a decent level of
care is provided. Given the tortfeasor's responsibility for the
child, this allocation of support responsibility seems fair.69
The fairness issue is more complicated when children
attempt to recover backup child support after their parents'
wrongful birth recovery has been reduced to reflect the benefits
that the tortfeasor's misconduct has bestowed on the parents.
As a practical matter, a child's recovery of additional support
would ordinarily inure to the benefit of the parents, too. If the
parents ought to bear these expenses rather than the defendant, a
direct child support action on behalf of the child could provide a
windfall to the parents and subvert the policies reflected in the
state's rules governing wrongful birth recoveries. 70 No counter-
vailing interest of the child seems to justify this unfairness so
long as the parents have adequate resources to provide for the
child.
But this objection to recovery by the child loses its force
when the family lacks adequate resources to provide for the
child's needs. This seems especially likely to occur in cases
where tortious conduct leads to the birth of a seriously disabled
child. It hardly seems an unjust windfall to the parents for the
child to receive backup support assistance after the family has
exhausted its resources. The joys bestowed on the parents may
be real enough, but they will not provide clothes, shelter, food,
education, or medical care for the child.71 Under these circum-
69. The basis for extending the tortfeasor's responsibility for a longer time than that
of the parents is discussed further below. See infra text accompanying notes 117-18.
70. Although reduction of parental recovery to account for unwanted "benefits" may
be unjust in some contexts, the proper way to correct this injustice is to revise the rules
governing wrongful birth recovery. So long as these rules reflect current state policy
regarding the appropriate allocation of responsibilities as between the adults, then recogni-
tion of an action by the child for additional support raises an obvious danger of injustice.
71. By similar reasoning, the child has a strong claim for backup child support when-
ever the parents' action is barred or reduced by comparative fault or the statute of limita-
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stances, the only windfall that the parents will receive is the joy
of seeing their child adequately supported. 72 As a matter of both
fairness and public policy, this "windfall" seems preferable to
inadequate care for the child or undue deprivation of other fam-
ily members.
As long as the action is limited to backup support, the
toughest allocation choices are not between the tortfeasor and
the parents but between the tortfeasor and those who would
otherwise bear the costs of inadequate family resources. Under
current law, either the affected children will bear this cost in the
form of inadequate support, or the cost will be absorbed by pri-
vate and public charities. As discussed in greater detail
below,74 the tortfeasor's culpability makes him a reasonable can-
didate to shoulder the responsibility for backup support.
Because the child's legitimate claims for backup support can be
recognized without materially disturbing the balance of equities
between the tortfeasor and the parents, recognition of the child's
claim for backup child support promises a better reconciliation
of the rights of all of the parties than current tort law provides.
D. Avoiding the Disadvantages of Wrongful Life Suits
An independent action for supplemental child support
would also avoid the major objections raised against wrongful
life recovery. Unlike a child seeking compensatory damages, the
child seeking support will not have to allege that she has a life
that is worse than having never existed at all. Although she will
still need to allege that her parents lost the opportunity to pre-
vent conception or obtain an abortion, she will not need to prove
that her life is a detriment. Instead, she need only allege that she
is entitled to assistance from those adults responsible for her
birth. As a result, a child support action will avoid the compari-
son between life and nonexistence, which has so troubled the
tions. The parents may fairly be asked to make their own contribution to the child's care
under these circumstances, but that should not bar the child from seeking backup support
from the tortfeasor once the parents' resources are exhausted.
72. A trust on behalf of the child could be used, if necessary, to insure proper applica-
tion of the funds. See Arche v. United States Dep't of Army, 798 P.2d 477, 486-87 (Kan.
1990) (discussing precedent for use of reversionary trusts to prevent misappropriation of
damage awards by parents).
73. See Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 829-30 (Fla. 1984) (Ehrlich, J., dissent-
ing) (father out of work and family on welfare); Mears v. Alhadeff, 451 N.Y.S.2d 133 (App.
Div. 1982) (unwed mother on welfare after unsuccessful abortion).
74. See infra text accompanying and following note 134.
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courts in wrongful life cases. Nor will it impugn the legal pre-
sumption entertained in many wrongful life cases that all lives
are worth living. In addition, the calculation of relief in a child-
support action is relatively concrete and clearly within the com-
petence of court and jury. In short, the childs' claim for support
assistance sidesteps the major objections to wrongful life claims.
A cause of action for backup child support also offers a sec-
ond advantage over wrongful life actions, which may be espe-
cially important in influencing courts to recognize this novel
claim. Rather than focusing attention on the child's handicaps
to determine whether the life of the child is "wrongful" or
"harmful," the child support action emphasizes the child's
potential and obliges the defendant to help make that potential a
reality. This emphasis on adequate care and support, rather
than redress for harm, may help to shape positive social expecta-
tions about integrating disabled individuals into our society by
emphasizing the need to provide them with the resources needed
to achieve their potential. For these reasons, advocates for dis-
abled persons who have criticized wrongful life claims in the
past7 5 may be more receptive to a claim for backup child
support.
On the other hand, the obvious shortcoming of an action
for backup child support is the limited relief provided. Courts
would also need to recognize a full wrongful life claim for com-
pensatory damages to provide complete protection for a cata-
strophically injured child. Even if such a claim were recognized,
however, general damages would be available only in the rare
cases where the child's injuries are so devastating that life itself
is harmful. In other cases, a backup cause of action for child
support would still be necessary to protect the child's interests in
adequate support.
E. Summary
Children have a strong normative claim for backup child
support against individuals whose misconduct leads to their
birth. When their families are unable to provide adequate sup-
port, resorting to the tortfeasor for backup support is a fair rec-
onciliation of the respective rights of the child, the parents, and
75. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUC-
TIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990's 69, 94 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989); Deborah
Kaplan, Disability Rights Perspectives on Reproductive Technologies and Public Policy, in
REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990'S, supra, at 246-47.
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the tortfeasor. Use of this family law remedy also sidesteps the
major objections raised to wrongful life claims by the affected
children.
III. BRIDGING THE BOUNDARY: DOCTRINAL ISSUES
Although a boundary crossing of this sort has no direct
analogies in family law or tort, each field provides some impor-
tant raw materials to build the necessary bridge. In tort, the
rules that impose a duty to rescue on tortfeasors who have a
special relationship with a person in need of assistance, or who
have caused the victim's predicament, are consistent with this
new cause of action. So, too, are family law precedents for
imposing child support responsibility on men who consent to
insemination, who induce a woman to forego abortion or adop-
tion, or who misrepresent their paternity to a child. While each
of these analogies has its limits, they collectively suggest that an
action for backup support can be reconciled with existing doc-
trine. Indeed, modification of several existing tort rules can be
used as alternative vehicles for filling the gap between tort and
family law. But each has problems that render it inferior to
direct acknowledgement of a new tort-based action for child
support.
A. Family Law
Unlike tort law, the family law governing child support
obligations does not turn inexorably on proof that a child has
been made worse off than she would have been but for the
defendant's conduct. Because the extent of support obligations
is based on the needs of the child rather than on the extent of
harm done to the child, family law appears to provide a more
natural home than tort for child support claims by children who
are born due to tortious conduct.
Family law child support awards are fundamentally differ-
ent from compensatory damage awards in tort. They are
intended to protect the needs of the child rather than to compen-
sate the child for past harms. Child support awards are deter-
mined by the needs of the child, the resources of the persons who
must contribute to the child's support, and community stan-
dards about suitable care.76 They are not dependent on or lim-
76. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320 (1982 & Supp. 1986); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-115 (1974 & Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.340 (Vernon 1980); UNIF.
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ited by the amount of harm that the defendant has previously
caused the child. Nor are they limited by tort statutes of limita-
tions, 77 or the availability of the legal parents to sue.78
Proper child support typically includes both the resources
necessary to protect the child from harm (such as funds for polio
vaccinations) and the resources necessary to make the child's
future brighter than it would otherwise be (such as funds for
education).79 Indeed, in the context of a growing child, the
rather static distinction between harming the child, on the one
hand, and merely failing to provide a benefit on the other, is
extremely difficult to apply and of limited relevance. It oversim-
plifies the task of deciding how much of the child's opportunity
for future well-being must be protected, nurtured, and advanced.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the harm-benefit distinc-
tion is not the litmus test of a person's support obligations. In
this respect, family law differs considerably from tort law. This
difference makes family law a promising home for a child sup-
port action based on tortious conduct that causes the life of a
child but does not harm the child.80
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 309, 9A U.L.A. 167 (1979); CLARK, supra note 15,
§ 17.1, at 719 (collecting statutory references); Henry H. Foster, Jr., et al., Child Support:
The Quick and the Dead, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1157, 1163 (1975); John W. Schmehl,
Note, Calculation of Child Support in Pennsylvania, 81 DICK. L. REV. 793 (1977). For
example, many states statutorily impose an obligation to provide care that is "proper" or
"suitable." See CLARK, supra note 15, § 17.1, at 719 nn.90-91 (citing state statutes that use
these phrases).
77. The child's right to seek support ordinarily ends on emancipation, see CLARK,
supra note 15, § 17.1, at 718 & n.82; or majority, see M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Adult
Child-Support, I A.L.R.2d 910, 914 (1948). Even if the noncustodial parent's obligations
have been set by a previous judicial support order, they may be modified in the event of
changed circumstances. CLARK, supra note 15, § 17.1, at 712-13. By federal law, states
that receive federal assistance for Aid to Families with Dependent Children must permit
paternity actions until the child's eighteenth birthday. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5) (West
1991); CLARK, supra note 15, § 4.4, at 183.
78. Most states allow the child, or someone suing on his behalf, to bring suit against
the parent. E.g., McQuade v. McQuade, 358 P.2d 470,472 (Colo. 1960) (child sued father
for support despite father's desertion of mother); Johnson v. Norman, 421 N.E.2d 124, 125-
27 (Ohio 1981) (mother brought support action, on behalf of child, against father); CLARK,
supra note 15, § 6.2, at 261. Typically, suit is brought by the parent who has custody of the
child, but the right of support belongs to the child. Id. § 17.1, at 712-13. Both the Uni-
form Parentage Act and the Uniform Act on Paternity would allow the child to bring the
action. UNIF. PARENTAGE AT § 6, 9A U.L.A. 302 (1987); UNIF. ACT ON PATERNITY
§ 2, 9B U.L.A. 352 (1987).
79. See CLARK, supra note 15, § 17.1, at 719, 722 (discussing college expenses).
80. Furthermore, when a child needs child support, her recovery is not reduced to
reflect the "joys" her custodial parent receives from raising her. When her mother sues for
child support, she is not denied relief on the grounds that she has custody of the child. See
id. § 17.1, at 712 (noncustodial parent cannot escape responsibility). By contrast, the
HeinOnline  -- 67 Tul. L. Rev. 423 1992-1993
TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
In family law, however, no precedent currently exists for
imposing child support obligations on tortfeasors who cause the
birth of a child. Instead, child support obligations are normally
imposed on other bases, such as genetic parenthood, consent,"1
or an existing in loco parentis relationship with the child. 2 Nev-
ertheless, family law provides some mildly helpful precedent.
First, one kind of tort-like misconduct already gives rise to child
support obligations. When a man misrepresents his paternity to
the child, the remedy for the wrong is the imposition of child
support responsibility, not an award of compensatory damages.
Second, family law imposes child support obligations when a
man's conduct leads to the birth of a genetically unrelated child.
The obvious example occurs when a husband consents to his
wife's artificial insemination by donor sperm. Furthermore,
courts would probably reach the same result if a man induced a
women to forego abortion with his promise to support the result-
ing child. Although these precedents do not compel the recogni-
tion of an action for backup child support by tortiously
conceived children, they do provide some useful raw materials
for building the necessary bridge between family law and tort.
courts deciding wrongful birth cases routinely reduce a parent's recovery of child support
expenses, or bar it altogether, on the grounds that the parents will enjoy the offsetting
benefits of parenting.
81. In many states, consent binds husbands who agree to artificial insemination of
their wives with donor sperm. See, e.g., People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. 1968)
(consent carries with it the legal responsibility of fatherhood); see also ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-10-201 (Michie 1991); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9A U.L.A. 302 (1979); CLARK,
supra note 15, § 4.1, at 153-54. Consent also binds adoptive parents, see Betz v. Horr, 11
N.E.2d 548, 550 (N.Y. 1937) (foster parent held liable for support as if a natural parent);
see also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 228-229 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1991) (same obligations as
natural parents); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-52 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1991) (same); CLARK,
supra note 15, § 20.10, at 927-29; and stepparents who promise to support a child, see, e.g.,
Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 709-10 (Ct. App. 1961) (husband accepted as his
own another's child); L. v. L., 497 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (defendant prom-
ised to support a child in gestation at marriage and accepted responsibility as if the child
were his own); see generally David B. Sweet, Annotation, Stepparents Duty to Support
Stepchild, 44 A.L.R.4th 520 (1986); contra, e.g., Byers v. Byers, 618 P.2d 930, 937 (Okla.
1980) (oral promise to care for another's child held unenforceable pursuant to statute of
frauds); R.D.S. v. S.L.S., 402 N.E.2d 30, 33-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (statute's support
provisions do not apply to illegitimate child not born to husband). Most of these cases
involve stepfathers, but a few involve foster parents. See In re Marriage of Valle, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 38, 41-42 (Ct. App. 1975) (adopted husband's brother's children); A.S. v. B.S., 354
A.2d 100, 101-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976) (acted exclusively as foster parents),
aff'd, 374 A.2d 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
82. At common law, the stepparent could end the obligation when no longer in loco
parentis. E.g., Franklin v. Franklin, 253 P.2d 337, 340 (Ariz. 1953); Clevenger, 111 Cal.
Rptr. at 711; In re Fowler, 288 A.2d 463, 465-67 (Vt. 1972); see CLARK, supra note 15,
§ 6.2, at 263-64. Some states impose a statutory obligation on stepparents. See id.
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1. Conduct Causing the Life of a Child
Two entirely different lines of authority provide precedent
for imposing support obligations on men whose conduct contrib-
ute to the birth of a genetically unrelated child. First, husbands
who consent to their spouse's artificial insemination by donor
sperm are obligated to support the resulting child.83 Second, a
line of contractual estoppel cases suggests that a strong claim for
child support will arise whenever a man induces a pregnant
woman to forego abortion or adoption in reliance on his promise
to support the child as his own. 4 In neither of these circum-
stances is the man's support responsibility dependent on proof of
harm to the child or limited to the extent of any such harm. In
each, conduct causing the birth of a child gives rise to the obliga-
tion. In this important respect, these cases support the imposi-
tion of child support obligations on tortfeasors whose
misconduct leads to the birth of a child, even if it does not harm
the child.
These two lines of family law cases do differ from wrongful
life cases in two material respects. While these differences
weaken the analogy, they do not destroy it. First, the defendants
in these family law cases, unlike defendants in wrongful life
cases, typically have a stepparent relationship with the affected
child. However, their legal liability does not turn, at least
explicitly, on proof that the men actually assumed a de facto
parent-child relationship with the child. Their liability arises
out of their involvement in the birth of the child. As a result, the
analogy survives this factual difference.
The strength of this analogy is more seriously limited by the
second factual difference between these family law cases and
wrongful life cases. In the artificial insemination and promise to
support cases, the child support obligation of the defendant is
based on a voluntary assumption of responsibility. In the case of
a foregone abortion or adoption, for example, the man has not
only induced the birth or retention of a child, but he has also
83. See supra note 81.
84. See Perkins v. Perkins, 383 A.2d 634, 636 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977) (husband's
promise to accept child deprived mother of opportunity to have the child adopted; thus,
action for support was legitimate); T. v. T., 224 S.E.2d 148, 149 (Va. 1976) (husband talked
wife out of adoption and promised to care for child as his own); see also Carter v. State
Bureau of Child Support Enforcement, 444 A.2d 271 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (mistakenly
believing the mother's assurances that child was his, the defendant persuaded the mother
not to abort, but did not agree to support the child; an implied contract to support the child
was not ripe for review).
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agreed in advance to accept parental responsibility for support.
Indeed, these cases are just a subset of a larger group of cases
imposing child support obligations pursuant to contract.-
Arguably, contractual consent is also present in the insemination
cases. As a result, these cases bridge the gap between family law
and contract, not between family law and tort. A bridge may be
easier to build at this border because contractual remedies are
not exclusively based on proof of harm.
Still, the contractual basis for the artificial insemination
cases should not be overstated. It is certainly not self-evident
that a husband who has consented to insemination has actually
agreed, implicitly or explicitly, to support the resulting child on
the breakup of the household. Our societal decision to imply a
promise to support from his consent to insemination is as much
a statement of our beliefs about the obligations that ought to
arise from his role in conception of the child, as it is an evalua-
tion of the actual understanding of tile parties. It is a statement
about the responsibility of the consenting husband for the birth
of the child and his resulting obligations to protect the interests
of that child. Viewed this way, it is not surprising that neither
the cases nor the statutes imposing parental responsibility
require proof of an actual agreement about long-term child
support.
So viewed, the consent-based cases are analogous to wrong-
ful life cases in one important respect. Consent to insemination
changes the status quo in a way that justifies liability for child
support. So, too, does tortious conduct that causes the birth of a
child. Even if the life of the resulting child is conceded to be a
blessing, some assessment must be made of the defendant's obli-
gation to contribute toward the new and ongoing responsibilities
which the birth of that child entails.
Having said this, however, one important qualification must
be made to the analogy. The family context in which husbands
consent to artificial insemination is quite different from the rela-
tionship that exists between a wrongful life defendant and the
aggrieved family. Those vast differences dictate quite different
parental rights and responsibilities for husbands who consent to
artificial insemination than would be appropriate for wrongful
life defendants. For example, the statutory trend regarding arti-
ficial insemination is to transfer full legal paternity, not merely
85. E.g., Clevenger, II Cal. Rptr. at 712-16; L. v. L., 497 S.W.2d. at 841-42.
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support obligations, from the sperm donor to the consenting
husband. 6 This complete reallocation of parental responsibility
is intended to help assure a supply of donors and to treat the
child like a natural offspring of the consenting couple, thereby
protecting the best interests of the mother and child and fairly
apportioning responsibility between the donor and the husband.
As I discuss further below, 7 a complete transfer of paternity like
this would ordinarily be inappropriate for tortiously induced
births because the child has natural and legal parents who
should assume the main parental roles. Nevertheless, the
wrongful life defendant's responsibility for a child's birth seems
sufficient to justify a lesser level of parental responsibility such as
secondary liability for child support.
2. Tortious Misconduct Giving Rise to Child Support
Obligations
Family law already imposes child support obligations as a
remedy for some tort-like misconduct. These cases provide
additional, although somewhat weaker, support for the tort-
based child support action proposed in this Article. The courts
impose this remedy when men interfere with the ability of a
child to obtain support from the natural father,88 or when they
mislead a stepchild into believing that they are the child's natu-
ral father.8 9 Although several courts refuse to apply these doc-
86. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (Deer-
ing 1983 and Supp. 1991); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE
U.S., INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 244 (1988).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 126-28.
88. Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 354 (N.J. 1984) (stepparent opposed visitation by
natural parent after his release from prison and refused the natural father's offers of child
support); see also In re Marriage of Valle, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38, 40-42 (Ct. App. 1975) (hus-
band accepted his brother's children from Mexico and raised them to age of 10 and 14 at
the time of divorce, all the while treating them as his own and playing the role of "Daddy";
these actions effectively deprived the children of resort to the natural parent).
89. In re Marriage of Johnson, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121, 122-23 (Ct. App. 1979) (stepchild
born 10 days before marriage and husband subsequently played role of father for six years);
In re Marriage of Valle, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 40 (children of husband's brother who lived in
Mexico); Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 714-17 (child resulting from adultery); M.H.B. v.
H.T.B., 498 A.2d 775, 776-77 (N.J. 1985) (Handler, J., concurring) (husband maintained
close relationship with child resulting from adultery, petitioned for custody of all children
including illegitimate). Estoppel under these circumstances arises when the stepparent has
made this representation with the intent that the child act on it and thereafter, the child has
detrimentally relied on the representation in ignorance of the truth. See Clevenger, 11 Cal.
Rptr. at 714. Sometimes this theory is combined with one alleging an express or implied
contract to support the child. See id. at 716. In other cases, it has supported recovery
where no contract has been proven. E.g., Miller, 478 A.2d at 357-59 (no promise to sup-
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trines in the absence of adequate proof,90 few have rejected them
outright.91
Because these cases rely on the malice or carelessness of the
stepparent as the basis for imposing support liability, they serve
as precedent for tort-based child support obligations. Signifi-
cantly, the remedy in the misrepresentation cases is a support
obligation rather than compensatory damages for emotional
injury. By mixing a tort-like wrong with a family law remedy,
these cases straddle the fields of tort and family law in a way
very similar to an action for backup child support. Further-
more, because the support obligation imposed in these cases
appears to be secondary to that of the natural parent,92 it closely
resembles the supplemental support obligation that this Article
proposes for tortiously induced births.
Nevertheless, the analogy is weakened by the requirement
that the child demonstrate some harm or detrimental reliance on
the stepfather's words or actions. 93 In this respect, the cases pre-
serve the harm requirement, at least in theory, as a predicate to
recovery even though the remedy is not harm-based. In addi-
tion, these cases typically involve stepparents who are or have
been in loco parentis. Under these circumstances, the stepfa-
ther's representations of paternity may have served as a conve-
nient basis for imposing parental responsibility on de facto
fathers without acknowledging as much. If so, the analogy to
tortiously induced births suffers further.
Notwithstanding these limitations, however, these cases
demonstrate judicial willingness to offer a child support remedy
for tortious conduct when it seems the appropriate remedy. For
two reasons, the wrongful life cases provide an even better occa-
sion for combining a tort duty with a child support remedy than
the misrepresentation cases. First, the plaintiffs in the wrongful
life cases, unlike those in the misrepresentation cases, cannot sue
for compensatory damages in lieu of support. Second, the
port); A.S. v. B.S., 354 A.2d 100, 101-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), aff'd, 374 A.2d
1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
90. E.g., P. v. S., 407 A.2d 244 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1978); Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767
(D.C. 1968);
91. But see, e.g., Carter v. State Bureau of Child Support Enforcement, 444 A.2d 271,
273-77 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (hostile to estoppel in favor of the child but hinting that
equitable estoppel might run in favor of the mother); R.D.S. v. S.L.S., 402 N.E.2d 30, 32-35
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (dictum rejecting both contract estoppel theories).
92. See M.H.B., 498 A.2d at 781; Miller, 478 A.2d at 359.
93. E.g., Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 714, 716-17; Miller, 478 A.2d at 355.
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tortfeasors in the wrongful life cases have interfered with paren-
tal decision making and caused the life of a child. By contrast,
the defendants in the misrepresentation cases are not responsible
for either the child's existence or the child's lack of adequate
support. Given these differences, the justification for a child
support remedy in the wrongful life cases is stronger than in the
misrepresentation cases.
3. Summary
Family law provides a care-based orientation consistent
with a secondary child support obligation in wrongful life cases.
While family law has no directly analogous precedent, it does
provide some useful raw materials for constructing the new
cause of action. First, it imposes child support responsibility on
nonparents who contribute to the birth of a child without requir-
ing proof of harm to the child. Second, it sometimes imposes a
child support remedy for tort-like misconduct. Admittedly, no
family law doctrine combines the two lines of cases the way an
action for backup child support would. This new claim would
base child support on tortious conduct that causes the life of a
child whether or not it harms the child. As a result, it would
require an extension of tort and family law beyond existing pre-
cedent. Yet the existing family law doctrines described in this
section, and the tort doctrines to be discussed in the next section,
suggest that this extension is compatible with existing doctrine.
B. Tort Law
Although wrongful life claims have fared poorly in tort, the
law of torts actually has some components that are surprisingly
consistent with a tort-based duty to provide secondary child sup-
port. For example, the tort rules imposing a duty to rescue in
special relationships provide a remarkably close, though inexact,
analogy to the obligation of backup child support. The tort
"benefits" rule also provides useful precedent for a support
action. This rule permits the court to ignore some benefits con-
ferred on the plaintiff by the tortfeasor. As a result, it permits
recovery even if the tort confers a net benefit on the plaintiff.
The analogy to wrongful life cases is obvious and was relied on
by the California Supreme Court as a basis for providing partial
relief in wrongful life cases.
With modifications, either the rescue doctrine or the bene-
fits rule could serve as an independent basis for providing partial
1992] 429
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relief in wrongful life cases. Courts that want to protect the
affected children but are reluctant to construct a novel doctrinal
bridge between tort and family law may, therefore, prefer to use
these doctrines. Likewise, some courts may prefer to add child
support to the remedies available in parental wrongful birth
actions rather than recognize an independent action by the child
for backup child support. Each of these routes would improve
on the status quo; but each has limitations that makes an
independent action for backup child support superior.
1. Rescue Doctrine
Tort law, of course, imposes no general obligation to act for
the protection of others.94 At common law, the only general
obligation owed to all other members of the community is to
refrain from tortious acts that create an increased risk of harm
to others. The law has, however, long recognized exceptions to
this general rule in the most compelling cases. The courts are
quite willing to impose an obligation to act for another's benefit
when the relation between the parties is "of such a character
that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act. ''96
94. This notion of a limited legal obligation to help one another, and of limited gov-
ernment intervention in individual freedom of action, has manifested itself in numerous
shocking cases well known to any student who has survived a class in torts. See, eg.,
Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928) (expert swimmer with boat and rope handy,
smoked his cigarette and watched another man drown), overruled by Pridgen v. Boston
Hous. Auth., 308 N.E.2d 467 (Mass. 1974); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 345-46 (Pa.
1959) (defendant incited a business visitor to jump into the water and then allowed him to
drown). Despite serious challenges to the privileged status of this individualistic perspec-
tive, e.g., James B. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. Rav. 97 (1908); Ernest J.
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980), and continual expansion
of the circumstances in which an obligation to protect others has been imposed, eg., Kline
v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477,481-85 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (land-
lord); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976) (psychologist);
Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 220-22 (Mich. 1976) (teenage drinking companion),
the general rule has clearly retained both substantial vigor and contemporary defenders.
They attribute normative, administrative, and efficiency advantages to the absence of a
general duty to rescue. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 3.
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) (defending nonliability for risks not caused by the defendant);
James A. Henderson, Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 901 (1982) (a gen-
eral duty to rescue would not adequately guide the behavior of either individuals or those
who judge them); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samari-
tans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83
(1978) (a general duty to rescue would not be more efficient).
95. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 56. The common law's lack of a general
obligation to help others has been attributed to the "highly individualistic philosophy" of
the early common law. Id.
96. Id. § 56.
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Sometimes, a relationship acquires this character because the
defendant is responsible for the plaintiff's predicament.97 At
other times, a duty is imposed because the very nature of the
relationship between the two parties challenges the individualis-
tic assumptions that underlie the general rule. On this latter
basis, innkeepers owe affirmative obligations to protect their
guests,98 common carriers to protect their passengers, 99 and even
teenagers to protect their drinking buddies.1°° An especially
important factor in determining whether a "special relationship"
of this sort exists is whether the person in need of assistance is
dependent on the defendant. 0 1 The second Restatement of Torts
summarizes the trend this way: "The law appears . .. to be
working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or pro-
tect in any relation of dependence or mutual dependence."' 0 2
Because a tortfeasor who causes the birth of a child is
responsible for the child's very existence, the relationship
between that tortfeasor and the child is a strong candidate for
inclusion among those special relationships that give rise to an
obligation to rescue. Even more than the child's parents, the
defendant is responsible for the child's birth. That child now
depends on adults for protection and support. Because the
tortfeasor created this dependency, the imposition of a limited
obligation to help protect that child from future harm by provid-
ing backup child support seems a reasonable response.
Tortfeasors who cause the birth of a child might, however,
97. Indeed, if a defendant's conduct puts the plaintiff in peril, he has a duty to act
even if the conduct that created the risk was neither negligent nor intentional. See, ag.,
Tubbs v. Argus, 225 N.E.2d 841, 842-43 (Ind. Ct. App. 1967) (passenger injured in defend-
ant's car); Hollinbeck v. Downey, 113 N.W.2d 9, 12-13 (Minn. 1962) (hooked golf ball
created duty to warn); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965) (creating risk of
injury); idL § 322 (injuring another and creating danger of further harm); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 2, § 56. When they create the need for help, these persons incur the responsibil-
ity to provide it. Similarly, voluntary rescuers must use reasonable care not to create new
or additional dangers for the rescued person. See, e.g., Erie Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 40 F.2d
855, 857 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 843 (1930); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 323-324 (1965).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(2) (1965).
99. Id.
100. Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 219-24 (Mich. 1976).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. b (1965). This factor may help
to explain the affirmative obligations of innkeepers, common carriers, employers, and espe-
cially of persons who take charge of helpless persons, id., or who voluntarily take "custody
of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for
protection," idt § 314A (innkeeper, common carrier, custodian); id. § 314B (employer); id
§ 320 cmt. b (depriving another of ability to protect self).
102. Id. § 314A cmt. b (1965).
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contend that they are entitled to rely on the child's parents to
protect the child.10 3 But this contention is unpersuasive in the
context of tortiously induced births, because the child's parents
have relied on the defendant in the first instance to avoid the
birth of the child. It is unfair for the defendant to shift the entire
financial burden to them merely because they have accepted
responsibility to rear the child.
The tort law governing rescue, therefore, provides the best
raw material from tort law for bridging the gulf between family
law and tort and gives an unexpected pedigree to the claims of
the resulting children. It should not be surprising that the bor-
ders of tort and family law are closest here. The rules imposing
an obligation to rescue manifest the broadest conception of indi-
vidual responsibility in tort law.
Having said this, however, an important caveat is neces-
sary. Optimal handling of the children's claims will still require
the blending of this tort doctrine with the family law remedy of
child support. In tort, the protection afforded to the child is
limited to protection against future harm."°4 This limitation on
rescue obligations threatens to mire the child's support action in
a debate over whether the child is in danger of harm or merely
wants an extra benefit from the tortfeasor. For example, the
defendant might concede that malnutrition would harm the
child but contend that vitamin pills are merely a benefit he is not
obliged to provide. Used this way, the harm-benefit distinction
seems likely to be a wooden proxy for minimally adequate care.
The more appropriate question is not whether the child is in
danger of harm but whether the child's needs are being fairly
met. To answer this question, courts need to consider how
much the child is likely to benefit from the requested care, the
resources of the child's family, and how much the defendant can
fairly be asked to sacrifice. That assessment cannot be reduced
103. See id. § 314A cmt. f (1965) ("He is not required to give any aid to one who is in
the hands of apparently competent persons .... ").
104. As a result, circumstances giving rise to an obligation to rescue are exceptions to
the act-omission distinction. But they do not entirely escape the harm-benefit distinction
because the two distinctions are not identical. Special relationships do, however, escape the
harm-benefit distinction in one important sense. The defendant must protect the plaintiff
from risks of harm that the defendant did not cause. In this sense, the defendant must do
more than avoid harming the plaintiff. He must confer a benefit. On the other hand, the
plaintiff need only be protected from harm by others. In other words, the benefit conferred
by the defendant is to protect the plaintiff from harm. In this respect, the harm-benefit
distinction is retained.
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to the beguiling simplicity of an either-or distinction between
harm and benefit. 105
Yet, the harm-benefit distinction is likely to remain a doc-
trinal requirement so long as the action is viewed exclusively as
one for compensatory damages in tort. It is here that lawmakers
would do well to bridge the border between family law and tort.
Although the rescue doctrine provides important raw material
for imposing support obligations on a person whose misconduct
results in a needy child, family law provides a more suitable
source of supplies from which to construct the remainder of the
bridge. For the remedy, lawmakers should look to family law
governing child support. As discussed above, some courts have
already done so in cases where a man misrepresents his paternity
to a stepchild. In those cases, the remedy is child support, not
damages for emotional distress.
2. The Special Benefits Rule
Of the three courts permitting recovery in wrongful life
cases, only the California Supreme Court offered a doctrinal jus-
tification for its decision. In Turpin v. Sortini,10 6 the court cited
the tort "benefits" doctrine as a basis for ignoring the benefits
conferred by the tortfeasor, thereby permitting recovery in the
absence of net harm to the child. Under this doctrine, only ben-
efits to the specific interest harmed by the tortious conduct may
be used to offset recovery and even then, only to the extent equi-
table. 107 As a result, the benefits doctrine sanctions recovery for
wrongful conduct even when the offending conduct has con-
105. Alas, the courts may still be obliged to engage in this task, With the gradual
abrogation of intrafamily immunities, children will be allowed to sue their parents for torts.
Because the parent-child relationship is likely to constitute a special relationship and, thus,
give rise to a tort obligation to rescue the child from harm, the courts may eventually be
obliged to decide whether the obligation to rescue extends beyond the obligation to protect
the child from accidents and, if it does, which kinds of parental neglect give rise to "harm."
106. 643 P.2d 954, 965-66 (Cal. 1982).
107. The Restatement of Torts states the rule as follows:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his
property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the
plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in miti-
gation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979). "Damages resulting from an invasion of
one interest are not diminished by showing that another interest has been benefited." Id.
cmt. b. For a more detailed discussion of this doctrine, see Peters, supra note 3, at 526-34
(discussing the special benefits rule and its possible application to wrongful life cases).
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ferred a net benefit on the victim. No tort doctrine so clearly
tolerates noncompensatory recovery.
Not surprisingly, the California Supreme Court believed
this rule provided useful raw material for fashioning relief in
wrongful life cases when no net harm could be proven. That
intuition is sound; the special benefits rule does illuminate the
damages issues in the wrongful life cases. In particular, it pro-
vides a basis for finessing the comparison between life and non-
existence. And if its application were expanded beyond the facts
of Turpin to include recovery of both ordinary and extraordi-
nary childrearing expenses, it would offer a potential alternative
to an action for backup child support. However, this application
of the benefits rule to wrongful life cases would resolve the dis-
pute between the tortfeasor and the child without considering
the defendant's claim that the parents should share in the
responsibility for support. Because of this, it presents a risk of
excessive recovery. Consequently, an action for backup child
support would be preferable.
a. Advantages of the Special Benefits Rule
The special benefits rule attempts to avoid windfalls to
plaintiffs while at the same time protecting them from being
forced to accept a trade of their interests for unwanted "bene-
fits." 108 As expressed in the Restatement, tort law mediates this
conflict by permitting offset within the same category of damage
when it is equitable to do so, but denying offset for benefits con-
ferred to a different interest than the one harmed.I0 9 Thus, a tort
yielding more financial benefits than it causes may not form the
basis for an award of damages for financial loss. Because the
type of benefit conferred closely resembles the type of harm suf-
fered, the goal of avoiding forced trades is only slightly
impinged, whereas the failure to aggregate would risk a windfall
to the plaintiff. On the other hand, medical expenses caused by a
surgery performed without the patient's consent may not be off-
set to reflect the surgery's success in reducing the patient's pain.
Otherwise, the plaintiff could be left physically comfortable but
impoverished.
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. f(1979). The Restatement's
illustration is illuminating. A landowner whose garden is wrongfully destroyed by a neigh-
bor who builds a more valuable garage in its place may recover the amount necessary to
remove the garage and restore the garden. Id. illus. 11.
109. Id. cmt. b, illus. 4.
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Wrongful life cases also present this dilemma. A child may
benefit from an act that gives him life but suffer from lack of
sufficient resources to obtain necessary medical care. Unfortu-
nately, the benefits conferred cannot be exchanged for the miss-
ing assets. Prohibiting offset prevents this forced trade. At the
same time, it avoids the problems associated with the calculation
of general damages in wrongful life cases.
Use of the benefits rule to defend recovery of extraordinary
medical costs in wrongful life cases, however, invites two distinct
criticisms. First, use of the rule arguably offends a common
interpretation of the benefits rule. Because pecuniary gains con-
ferred by the defendant's action may be used to offset pecuniary
losses incurred, the tortfeasor in a wrongful life case arguably
should be entitled to reduce her liability for the child's medical
expenses by any financial benefits, such as the ability to earn
money, conferred on the child by life itself. Yet the California
Supreme Court never considered these possible future financial
benefits to the deaf child who sued in Turpin when it permitted
her to recover her extraordinary expenses.
This criticism can be answered in two ways. First, many
disabled children will have no prospect of significant future
financial benefits, such as wages or inheritance. Although the
child may be eligible for governmental or charitable assistance,
the tortfeasor is in a weak position to demand that the child rely
on these sources of support. Given the tortfeasor's role in the
child's birth, she is poorly situated to benefit from the willing-
ness of others to rescue the child if she does not." 0 Second, it
may be inequitable to take future financial benefits into account
even if they are likely. The second Restatement of Torts rightly
recommends that recovery not be reduced to reflect benefits con-
ferred by the tortfeasor when doing so would be unfair.III There
are two reasons why reduction of a disabled child's recovery to
reflect potential future earnings will often be inequitable. First,
his future resources cannot be readily exchanged for the special
facilities and care that he needs at present. Second, his future
earnings will be needed to support him in the future. They
should not be treated as surplus earnings for purposes of reduc-
ing the child's recovery unless they are likely to exceed the sup-
110. For a further discussion of the choice between tortfeasor liability and public
assistance, see infra text accompanying and following note 134.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. f (1979); see DAN B. DOBBS,
REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION § 3.6, at 182 (student ed. 1973).
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port needs that the plaintiff will have at the times he earns them.
Accordingly, courts should be extremely reluctant to endanger
the child's clear and immediate financial needs to reflect future
surplus earnings that may never be realized.
A second problem with the use of the benefits rule is more
troublesome. Even if the benefits conferred by the defendant are
ignored, the plaintiff must still demonstrate harm to one or more
of her interests in order to recover compensatory damages. Joy
Turpin, for example, can only demonstrate harm to her distinct
interest in medical care if having extraordinary medical needs is
worse than never having existed. 112 This reintroduces the very
comparison that courts have tried to avoid.
One way to resolve this dilemma within the confines of
traditional tort doctrine is to narrow the comparison. Rather
than comparing the child's extraordinary expenses to the state of
nonexistence, courts could compare the child's actual costs to
the costs that would be incurred if the child had not been born.
Because nonexistence would generate no medical costs, all the
child's medical costs must be attributed to the tortious conduct.
This approach avoids any attempt to calculate the overall value
of the child's life. Thus, it avoids the philosophical and moral
dilemmas raised by the claim that life itself can be harmful. In
addition, this calculation is far more concrete than calculation of
the extent to which a disabled child's suffering exceeds the joys
of living. The California Supreme Court emphasized this con-
creteness when explaining its decision in Turpin.
As a result, both potential problems with application of the
benefits rule can be resolved. However, courts that decide to
follow Turpin in its use of the benefits rule should be careful to
avoid the unduly narrow application of the rule suggested by
that court. The case incorrectly suggests that only disabled chil-
dren can recover,1 1 3 and only for their extraordinary expenses.
Contrary to the court's assumption, a disabled child will also
need help with ordinary costs, like food, clothing, and shelter,
112. When the special benefits rule is applied in ordinary cases, the plaintiff's
adversely affected interest, like reputation, has been made worse off by the tortious conduct.
So the special benefits rule does not necessarily dispense with the need to show harm to the
individual interest for which recovery is permitted even though it does dispense with the
need to prove net harm to the plaintiff's overall interests. The traditional conception of
harm may still govern the way that compensable injury to an individual interest is identified
and measured.
113. See Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 88 (Ct. App. 1983) (healthy child born
to woman in mental health facility denied recovery under Turpin).
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especially after the legal support obligation of the parents has
ended.114 In some cases, even healthy children will have unmet
support needs. Under the logic of the benefits rule, ordinary
child support costs should also be recoverable at least to the
extent that they exceed future surplus earnings. That is because
ordinary support costs, like extraordinary ones, exceed the sup-
port costs that would have been incurred if the child were never
born. 115
b. Disadvantages
If recovery using the benefits rule were expanded to include
ordinary support expenses, it could serve as a potential substi-
tute for recognition of an action for backup child support. This
route to recovery offers the advantage of using existing doctrine.
Unfortunately, it also presents a risk of excessive recovery.
Sometimes the recovery of full child-rearing costs will be a fair
result, as when a child's parents are unable to support him or are
no longer legally obligated to do so (as is often the case with
post-majority expenses). An unfair outcome could occur, how-
ever, whenever the recovery of support expenses by the child
would allow the parents to evade the limits on their own right to
recovery imposed by wrongful birth doctrine.1 6 In those cases,
the recovery of full child-rearing costs could result in an exces-
sive award to the family as a whole unless the family can estab-
lish that they lack the resources necessary to protect the child's
interests.
To cure this problem, the courts would have to apply the
benefits rule in a way that takes account of the child's needs and
the family's resources. In essence, this would disguise what
amounts to a new action for backup child support as a tradi-
tional tort action for compensatory damages. Explicit recogni-
114. Arguably, however, even these basic needs are "extraordinary" if the child is
unable to provide them for herself after reaching the age of majority. They are all
extraordinary in the sense that they exceed the needs a healthy child would have.
115. Turpin rejected pain and suffering damages, in part, because these damages were
likely to be offset by the emotional pleasures of life. But the court never addressed the
merits of a claim for ordinary child support expenses, even though these costs, like
extraordinary medical expenses, constitute "economic loss." Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d
954, 965 (Cal. 1982).
116. This could occur whenever the parents had standing to recover the costs in ques-
tion but their recovery was limited or offset to reflect the joys of parenting or where recov-
ery was barred or restricted due to defenses based on parental conduct. It will not occur in
cases where the child recovers only those support expenses that arise after the legal support
obligation of the parents has ended.
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tion of an action for backup child support seems preferable for
two reasons. First, use of the benefits rule to accomplish this
result would require modifications that would seem unprincipled
without a nontort rationale. Second, use of the benefits rule
would obscure the most powerful and easily understood norma-
tive basis for recovery. Simply stated, some of these children
will have support needs for which the person who has tortiously
caused the child's birth is rightly held responsible. By obscuring
this underlying rationale, the benefits approach will likely render
the child's claim less compelling. Certainly, the unwillingness of
any other court to follow the California Supreme Court in its
reliance on the benefits rule supports this fear.
Until lawmakers look beyond tort law for their rationale,
courts that permit recovery will remain vulnerable to criticism
that their rulings are unprincipled. Furthermore, until tort
rationales are supplemented, courts that allow recovery are
unlikely to fashion proof requirements that are fair to all the
parties. They are unlikely to appreciate that both disabled and
healthy children will sometimes need help with ordinary
expenses. They are also unlikely to recognize that their assump-
tions about a disabled child's unmet needs may be unfounded.
Recognition of an action for backup child support is, therefore,
more likely to produce both a solid factual record concerning the
suitability of relief, and a more precisely tailored monetary
award than use of the benefits rule.
3. Reform of Wrongful Birth Doctrine
With several important modifications, the law governing
parental wrongful birth actions could protect the affected chil-
dren much more adequately than it does now. Use of wrongful
birth actions to protect these interests in lieu of a new action for
backup child support would have the advantage of borrowing
and building on familiar doctrine. The countervailing disadvan-
tage, however, is that the modifications necessary in order to
eliminate the need for an independent claim for backup child
support are difficult to rationalize as components of the parents'
wrongful birth action. As a result, an independent action on
behalf of the children is preferable to relying entirely on reform
of wrongful birth doctrine.
The first of four major doctrinal steps that would greatly
improve the parents' cause of action as a vehicle for protecting
the children is to allow parents to recover for support costs
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likely to be incurred beyond the child's majority and even
beyond the death of the parents. 17 Many states already allow
postmajority support for unemancipated, disabled children, 18
and others could improve the adequacy of their wrongful birth
recovery by doing likewise. Under the logic of the harm require-
ment as traditionally interpreted, however, courts could award
these additional damages to the parents in their tort action only
if the parents were themselves legally obligated to provide this
additional support. Extension of parental liability to exclude
postmajority support and, to an even greater extent, the exten-
sion of recovery to include expenses likely to be incurred after
the death of the parents, would require a major extension of
parental responsibility with implications extending far beyond
wrongful birth actions. For this reason, courts may reasonably
refuse to endorse it.
A stronger case can be made for imposing postmajority
child support on the tortfeasor than on the parents because the
responsibility of the tortfeasor to the child arises out of antisocial
conduct. This point is likely to be overlooked as long as parental
wrongful birth actions are the exclusive vehicle for protecting
the welfare of the children, because the tortfeasor's liability for
support in wrongful birth actions is derivative of the parents'
obligation. By contrast, an independent action that posits a
direct tortfeasor responsibility to the child would permit the
courts to consider whether the tortfeasor's misconduct justifies a
postmajority support obligation, regardless of whether the par-
ents, too, are liable for that support. For this reason, a new
cause of action for backup child support seems superior to modi-
fying the law governing parental wrongful birth actions.
The second reform that would improve the protection
offered by parental wrongful birth actions is to insulate parental
117. To adequately protect an affected child, parental recovery for postmajority
expenses would need to include both extraordinary expenses associated with any birth
defects and also any ordinary expenses, like food, shelter and clothing, that the child can-
not provide for himself because of his handicaps.
118. Some courts have been able to avoid the problem of postmajority support by
concluding as a matter of statutory or common law that the parents' obligation to support
an unemancipated and incapacitated child continues beyond majority. See Gallagher v.
Duke Univ., 852 F.2d 773, 778 (4th Cir. 1988) (parents' life expectancy); Robak v. United
States, 658 F.2d 471,478 (7th Cir. 1981); Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1317
(D.S.C. 1983); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1207 n.8 (Colo. 1988); Blake v. Cruz,
698 P.2d 315, 321 (Idaho 1985) (statutory duty); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 11
(Mass. 1990); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 350 (N.H. 1986) (statutory duty); James G. v.
Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 882-83 (W. Va. 1985).
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recovery of support costs from reduction for the joys of parent-
ing. At least one state already does so in the belief that reduc-
tion of recovery to reflect forced benefits is unfair to the
parents. 119 "It was precisely to avoid that 'benefit,'" said the
court, "that the parents went to the physician in the first
place."120
However, in jurisdictions that believe that offset is neces-
sary to avoid a parental windfall, this modification would pro-
tect the child at the expense of an apparent injustice between the
adults. To defend it, these courts would have to acknowledge
that the child has a separate noncompensatory interest in
backup child support that justifies recovery when parental
resources are inadequate-notwithstanding any joys bestowed
on the parents. In substance, if not in form, this would amount
to recognition of an independent tort action for child support on
behalf of the child, rather than a rethinking of the parents'
rights. As a result, this reform of wrongful birth doctrine seems
less honest than direct recognition of an independent action for
backup child support.
The third necessary reform would be to insulate the support
portion of the parents' claim from defenses that should not bar
the child from recovery. These might include rejection of the
ordinary adult statute of limitations and insulation of the child
support portion of the claim from comparative fault reduction to
reflect parental negligence. Both of these modifications would
provide the child with protections similar to those provided in
an ordinary child support action against a natural parent. But
both would appear unprincipled when extended to wrongful
birth actions so long as the parents' action is perceived as a tort
action by the parents to recover for their own harm.
Collectively, these reforms would form the equivalent of a
new cause of action for child support. They would, however,
hide it within a parental action that sounds exclusively in tort.
Honesty and clarity counsel for separate recognition of the
child's claim. Separation would also permit states that deny
child support recovery altogether in wrongful birth actions to
endorse an action for backup child support. In addition, an
independent action would offer portability. Children who are
abandoned or surrendered for adoption could use this portability
119. Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 248-49 (Wis. 1990).
120. Id. at 249.
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to obtain child care pending placement, and even after place-
ment, if necessary.12 1 For these reasons, honest recognition of a
new tort-based claim for child support provides a better way to
protect the welfare of these children than exclusive reliance on
modifications of wrongful birth doctrine.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The ultimate wisdom of recognizing a tort-based claim for
child support is a question of values and of policy, not a matter
of logic. Because this claim straddles the fields of family law and
tort, its policy implications do not fit neatly into the traditional
categories used to evaluate tort doctrine. Nevertheless, it is
likely that many courts and commentators will reasonably ask
how this proposed tort-based cause of action fares when mea-
sured against tort law's holy trinity: fairness, compensation, and
social consequences (including deterrence). For that reason, the
following policy discussion is organized around these goals.
A. Fairness
The fairness of the child's claim against the tortfeasor pro-
vides the most important argument for recognizing the claim.
The tortfeasor's misconduct has irreversibly changed the status
quo by creating a new life with new needs. The tortfeasor's cul-
pability and his causal responsibility for the birth of a dependent
child materially distinguishes his conduct from other harmless
negligence. Furthermore, it justifies a novel approach to the
issues of injury and relief that does not rely on proof of harm,
but focuses instead on proof of the child's need for backup
support.
As discussed in Part II, a carefully fashioned action for
backup child support promises to fairly accommodate both the
child's legitimate claim against the tortfeasor, and the
tortfeasor's claim for a just allocation of support responsibility
between tortfeasor and parents. Because this new obligation
would backup the responsibility of the parents, rather than
replace it, it should satisfy the concern of many courts that the
liability of the defendant be both proportional to the misconduct
and fairly apportioned with the parents.
Even jurisdictions that have voiced the strongest objections
121. In the case of a disabled child, for example, potential parents may be more ready
to adopt if the medical expenses are provided by the tortfeasor.
1992]
HeinOnline  -- 67 Tul. L. Rev. 441 1992-1993
442 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
to making tortfeasors into "surrogate parents" have been willing
to transfer some obligations to the tortfeasor in the clearest
cases. The Florida Supreme Court, for example, stated that par-
ents have the sole obligation for supporting their children under
Florida law and, on this basis, denied wrongful birth recovery of
ordinary rearing expenses. The court, however, proceeded to
allow parental recovery for the extraordinary costs associated
with the child's birth defects. By doing so, it transferred a por-
tion of the responsibility for the child's support to a third-party
tortfeasor. 122 Notwithstanding its visceral objections to the re-
allocation of support responsibility to a party who receives none
of the benefits of parenting, the court tolerated just that result
because re-allocation was fair under the circumstances. 123
But because a new tort-based cause of action for support
would permit recovery against a defendant who may not have
caused any harm to the child, and who in the eyes of some, may
have conferred a benefit on the child, this new action is likely to
be challenged as an abandonment of the values that underlie the
harm requirement. From this point of view, the harm require-
122. Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 1984).
123. Courts routinely impose support obligations on tortfeasors to the extent that
they can do so without running afoul of the harm requirement. When the negligence of a
third party causes a child to suffer injuries likely to require costly medical care, the family
can recover, While the child would recover for pain and suffering and loss of future wages,
the parents will ordinarily hold the claim for medical expenses unless they waive it. See,
e.g., Blue Cross/Blue Shield v. St. Cyr, 459 A.2d 226, 228 (N.H. 1983) (parents' claim
viable rather than child's because parent liable for minor child's medical expenses); Davis
v. Drackett Prods. Co., 536 F. Supp. 694, 697 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (applying Ohio law; joint
child-parent action for medical care). Furthermore, when tortiously inflicted injuries to the
parents threaten the welfare of their children, the children are protected by the ability of
their parents to recover lost wages or the costs of substitute child care. If the injured parent
dies before recovery, the children are protected by survival statutes, see KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 2, § 126, and wrongful death statutes, see id. Increasingly, courts are also
allowing children to recover for the loss of parental consortium. See, eg., Ueland v. Pengo
Hydra-Pull Corp., 691 P.2d 190, 191 (Wash. 1984); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344
N.W.2d 513, 522.(Wis. 1984). Contra Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 860-
61 (Cal. 1977); Northwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318, 332 (Or.
1982). All seven of the states that recognized the claim as of 1988 had done so since 1980.
See Dearborn Fabricating & Eng'g Corp. v. Wickam, 532 N.E.2d 16, 16-18 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988), vacated, 551 N.E.2d 1135 (Ind. 1990). Twenty-six states reject this claim. Finally,
many courts allow parents to bring wrongful birth actions for some or all of their child
support costs. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59, 66-68. When harm can be
demonstrated, therefore, courts readily protect children against tortious threats to their
care. The major obstacle to recovery in wrongful life cases has been the requirement that
the child prove harm, not a public policy against third-party contributions toward support
of the child. The difficult question is not whether support obligations should ever be
imposed on nonparents, but rather when and how much.
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ment states the moral limits of our responsibilities toward each
other. This concern can be answered. Our legal system has
always been ready to impose obligations that extend beyond the
duty to avoid harm when the circumstances justify doing so.
Tort law, for example, imposes a duty to rescue in special rela-
tionships regardless of whether the defendant has caused the
plaintiff any harm. The benefits rule, also, has the effect of per-
mitting recovery by plaintiffs who on balance have suffered no
harm from the defendant's actions. In family law, moreover,
proof of harm has never been an absolute prerequisite to recov-
ery. These existing doctrines illustrate the judiciary's willingness
to impose affirmative obligations that extend beyond the avoid-
ance of harm when the equities justify it. The wrongful life cases
are strong candidates for similar treatment.
An action for backup child support would serve the
demands of justice while avoiding the problems that doomed the
tort action for compensatory damages. Because it escapes the
comparison between life and nonexistence, damages are calcula-
ble and do not require a finding that life itself is a legally cogni-
zable injury. To the contrary, the orientation of the child
support action is to enable the disabled, to focus on the future,
not the past, and to emphasize the child's potential, not her
injury.
B. Compensation
The tort goal of compensation for harm, on the other hand,
simply does not apply to the child's claim for child support.
Unlike the child's wrongful life claim for general damages in
tort, the child's support claim is not designed to make the child
whole or to redress past harms. Instead, it is intended to protect
the child's welfare by fairly allocating responsibility among
adults morally responsible for the child's birth. Thus, it serves a
social policy objective more commonly associated with family
law than tort. But it borrows from tort law its definition of the
kind of conduct that ought to give rise to a support obligation.
In this respect, it resembles child support actions based on mis-
representations of paternity, where the violation of a tort-like
duty gives rise to an obligation of child support.
This goal of protecting the child's welfare is not in conflict
with the tort policy of compensation. It exists independently of
that tort policy and supplements it. The judicial presumption
that life is always a benefit may make compensatory damages
1992] 443
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inappropriate, but it does not tell us whether the defendant
should contribute to the child's support and, if so, to what
extent. That question turns on the fairness of allocating respon-
sibility to the tortfeasor and the social consequences likely to
flow from liability.
In one respect, tort and family law compensation policies
converge in this hybrid action. At the same time that it serves
the family law goals of insuring adequate support from a respon-
sible party, this cause of action allocates the catastrophic costs of
tortious misconduct to a tortfeasor who can distribute that cost
more broadly.
C. Social Consequences
Not surprisingly, a new cause of action for child support
has the potential for both desirable and undesirable conse-
quences. Given the strong normative arguments in support of
the claim, the judicial reception that it ultimately receives is
likely to turn on judicial beliefs about the desirability and
probability of the potential consequences.
1. Impact on the Family
Tort liability for child support is likely to strengthen the
families that receive it. It helps insure the resources necessary to
fulfill the family mission successfully, without the potentially
divisive allegations about the worthlessness of the child that
encumber the pure tort actions for wrongful birth and wrongful
life. In some cases, the prospect of tort assistance might even
convince parents not to abort an unplanned pregnancy or not to
surrender a handicapped child for adoption. And in cases where
the parents surrender the child, support funds improve the pros-
pects for a desirable placement.
Furthermore, the action for backup support raises no spec-
ter of future actions by children against their parents. Whereas
wrongful life actions for compensatory damages could conceiva-
bly be asserted against careless parents (and their insurers), a
backup action for child support would make no sense against
parents who already owe the primary obligation of support to
their children. As a result, children will not be suing parents
under this new theory.
In addition, backup tort liability reinforces the provider's
incentive to protect the parents' procreative rights. Because lia-
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bility arises out of an initial breach of duty to the parents, the
defendants will escape liability by exercising more care to
respect parental wishes.
In some cases, however, the claim would provide an incen-
tive for interference with parental reproductive choice. The
risks are greatest in institutional settings where the tortfeasor's
carelessness consists of failure to supervise the sexual activity of
legally incompetent patients, thereby permitting an ill-advised
conception. 24 The threat of liability could conceivably induce
overdeterrence, such as draconian policing of sexual activity of
all institutionalized persons with borderline competency.1 25 This
risk seems quite speculative because an action for backup sup-
port would only add marginally to the existing incentives posed
by a potential wrongful birth action, but the risk cannot be dis-
missed. Courts that are, therefore, uncomfortable with a cause
of action based on failure to monitor the consensual sexual activ-
ity of patients who lack legal competency could limit liability to
cases of nonconsensual intercourse, such as the rape in Cowe.
Another potential effect on the family is the possibility that
the tortfeasor might be assigned other parental rights or respon-
sibilities. That is the subject of the next section.
2. Unbundling Parental Rights and Responsibilities
By its very nature, a new child support action will require
courts to unbundle one of the parental responsibilities ordinarily
associated with legal parenthood and to assign it to a third party
on a theory borrowed from tort law. Although a new support
actioh would add only incrementally to the existing tort and
family law doctrines that already permit some similar
unbundling of parental roles, this explicit unbundling of parental
rights and responsibilities raises the question of what other
parental rights or responsibilities should attach to the
tortfeasor's conduct. If the relationship between the child and
the tortfeasor justifies backup support liability, perhaps that rela-
124. See, eg., Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal Rptr. 84, 87 (Ct. App. 1983) (negligent
failure to supervise or provide birth control devices for women in mental health facility);
Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 962, 965-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (rape of institu-
tionalized woman), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1991); Williams
v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343, 343 (N.Y. 1966) (rape of institutionalized mental patient).
125. See Foy, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 91-93 (rejecting liability for a mental health facility's
failure to supervise consensual sex by residents because, among other things, liability would
be too restrictive on patient institutional rights, but allowing a claim for failure to provide
contraceptives and counseling).
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tionship should also carry other rights or responsibilities.
Tortfeasors might contend, for example, that payment of child
support to a child whom the tortfeasor has not harmed is the
kind of parental obligation that ought to carry with it parental
rights such as visitation or medical decisionmaking.
These are not new issues. They arise most prominently in
connection with the use of reproductive technologies such as
artificial insemination by donor or the hiring of surrogates. 126 In
some of those circumstances, parties who are not genetically
related to the child end up with parental rights as well as paren-
tal responsibilities. In tort cases, however, the harm require-
ment served as an ostensible limit on similar expansion of
parental roles. In tort, no legal liability theoretically arose
unless harm was caused and, even then, the tortfeasor's involve-
ment was limited to financial redress of the harm done. This
approach obviated the need to answer hard questions about any
other parental responsibilities that ought to attach to tortious
misconduct and, a fortiori, mooted any questions about the
kinds of parental rights that the tortfeasor should enjoy.1 27
Because a tort-based action for child support steps beyond
the boundaries of traditional tort doctrine, the harm require-
ment no longer serves as a basis for sidestepping questions about
parental rights and responsibilities. The questions will have to
be addressed on their merits. But tortious conduct that results
in the birth of a child raises these issues of the parental role in a
quite different context than, for example, artificial insemination
by a donor. Because of these differences, the cases in which it
would be appropriate to expand the tortfeasor's parental role
beyond responsibility for backup child support will probably be
quite rare.
Two of the differences between wrongful life and reproduc-
tive technology cases are especially important. First, the
tortfeasor's responsibility arises out of misconduct toward the
126. See Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:
An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 298 (discussing intention-based
assignment of parenthood).
127. This approach worked tolerably well for ordinary tort cases, but even there it
has received serious criticism. Simply stated, the criticism is that exclusive reliance on
monetary awards permits tortfeasors to escape the consequences of their misdeeds too eas-
ily. As a result, Leslie Bender has advocated that they also be obligated to assist in the
emotional and rehabilitative needs of their victims. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts:
Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DuKE L.J.
848, 901-08.
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child's family. This reduces the strength of any claim to paren-
tal rights by the tortfeasor notwithstanding the benefits of life
conferred on the child by his misconduct. Second, the tortfeasor
is a stranger to the family. This markedly distinguishes him
from a husband who consents to his wife's artificial insemination
with donor sperm. Instead, the tortfeasor resembles other cate-
gories of men on whom courts have imposed child support obli-
gations without automatically assuming, at least explicitly, that
other parental rights or parental responsibilities should automat-
ically accompany that support. These men include de facto
fathers who have interfered with access by the natural father,
men who represented themselves to be the natural father of the
child, and men who have encouraged a woman to bear and raise
a child conceived by another man. 128 Indeed, tortfeasors who
induce a child's birth are much less closely connected to the
affected families than any of these other groups of men and, as a
result, less likely to be suitable as candidates for intimate rights
or responsibilities.
Given the lack of any family relationship between the
tortfeasor and the affected family, courts will rarely encounter
good faith claims by the tortfeasor for visitation rights. If they
are made at all, these claims will ordinarily be part of an overall
negotiating strategy intended to reduce the ultimate settlement
amount, not to obtain parental rights. The most likely
exceptions to this generalization would be tortfeasors who are
ordered to make periodic support payments rather than a lump
sum. A few of these tortfeasors might desire a personal relation-
ship with the child as well. Given the tortfeasor's initial miscon-
duct and the lack of a freestanding personal relationship with
the family, however, my own inclination would be to treat the
choice of a periodic payment schedule as an insufficient basis on
which to justify the bestowal of any visitation or custody rights.
Alternatively, some courts might opt to award lump sums to
avoid this possible entanglement.
Just as further parental rights will seldom be appropriate,
neither should the tortfeasor have greater responsibilities. So
long as the tortfeasor is a stranger to the child, the best interests
of the child will rarely justify an order that the tortfeasor play a
128. Most of these cases have not addressed the issue. But in one, a stepfather, whose
promises to a pregnant woman that he would treat the child as his own had helped induce
the woman to marry him, was required to pay child support and given "reasonable rights of
visitation." Perkins v. Perkins, 383 A.2d 634, 637 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977).
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greater role in raising the child. The strongest cases for
expanding the tortfeasor's role beyond financial support would
arise whenever one or both of the natural parents is unable to
rear the child. In the Cowe case, for example, a healthy child
was born to two parents with serious mental incapacities. This
scenario seems unlikely to occur with any regularity. But when
it does, courts will need to examine these disputes on a case-by-
case basis to decide whether the nature of the tortfeasor's con-
duct and the present circumstances of the family dictate expan-
sion of the tortfeasor's role beyond backup child support. The
prospect of this line-drawing may be unappealing to some
courts, but if so, they can ameliorate this concern without rejec-
tion of the action altogether. Instead, those courts could award
lump-sum recoveries and treat the parties as strangers thereafter.
3. Deterrence
A new tort-based cause of action for child support has the
potential to provide additional incentives for greater care. The
incremental deterrent effect that results will "foster the societal
objectives of genetic counseling and prenatal testing, and will
discourage malpractice."12 9 Two of the courts recognizing
wrongful life actions for extraordinary support expenses have
assumed as much. 130 However, tort liability could also cause
undesirable changes in provider behavior and in the cost and
availability of some medical services. This danger constitutes
the most serious disadvantage associated with this cause of
action. Fortunately, there are several reasons to doubt that
excessive deterrence will occur. In addition, the social benefits
from the transfer of funds from provider to child are likely to be
significant. As a result the risks should not preclude cautious
experimentation with the claim.
Inappropriate responses could take several forms. For
example, the nursing home in Cowe might be more inclined to
seek sterilization of patients rather than improve its supervision.
Or physicians whose negligence leads to the birth of a child
might have even more incentive than is already provided by the
specter of wrongful birth liability to encourage the mother to
abort, especially if she is poor and likely to need backup child
129. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496 (Wash. 1983).
130. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 n.15 (Cal. 1982) ("provide a comprehensive
and consistent deterrent to negligent conduct"); Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496 (see language
quoted supra in text accompanying note 129).
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support. But there is no evidence that wrongful birth doctrine
has caused these results. A supplemental action for backup
child support seems unlikely to materially increase that risk.
Because the risk of liability for backup support would be
greatest in the treatment of poor patients (who are most likely to
need backup support in the event of an unwanted birth), recog-
nition of this action could also provide a disincentive to serve
these patients. This potential impact is quite different from the
disincentive effects of patient income in other malpractice
actions. In other tort cases, potential liability is greatest when a
high-income patient is injured because of the risk that the
patient will lose earnings as the result of an injury. Nevertheless,
I am skeptical that an action for backup support would deter the
provision of service to poorer patients-as long as the providers
are being paid for serving those patients. It might, however,
provide further disincentives to providing unpaid medical care.
Even so, this marginal disincentive is likely to be trivial relative
to the existing disincentives to treating these patients. As a
result, this risk seems to be outweighed by the risk of leaving the
resulting children underprotected.
In addition to these potentially adverse consequences, a new
cause of action for backup child support could also conceivably
induce too much investment in otherwise desirable kinds of acci-
dent avoidance, like better equipment or training. This surpris-
ing possibility exists because a backup support action would
impose liability where no "harm" has been proven. In this
respect, child support liability arguably resembles punitive dam-
ages or fines. Like those remedies, backup support awards
would not compensate for harm caused to the plaintiff. Thus,
the threat of child support liability might create an incentive to
invest an additional amount in the avoidance of accidents that
do no harm to the plaintiff.131 The risk of additional damages
131. The eventual impact of noncompensatory costs like these is difficult to predict.
The tortfeasor could avoid liability by exercising reasonable care. That might prevent
undue defensive medicine. On the other hand, a tortfeasor with doubts about how their
conduct will be judged in the future could invest additional time and money in accident
avoidance because of the risk of support damages. If a potential defendant can reduce the
chance of erroneously being adjudged negligent by taking more care, he may do so. RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 176-77 (3d ed. 1986). The greater the
liability, the more they are apt to spend. The availability of liability insurance may mini-
mize this, at least if insurers fail to take steps to reduce the accidents caused by their
insured (such as by charging loss-based premiums or supervising the risk management
practices of their insurers). WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EO-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 13 (1987).
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could also drive premiums up and thereby make the medical
services more expensive. In some cases, providers may stop
offering the service. Even if they continue to offer it, the higher
prices will reduce the affordability and, thus, the use of geneti-
cists, obstetricians, urologists, and others whose carelessness can
result in the birth of a child against parental wishes. Under
traditional tort efficiency analysis, these consequences would be
undesirable unless the harm caused by the unintended births
outweighs the social costs of this additional investment in acci-
dent avoidance. 132
There are at least five reasons to doubt that a backup action
for support will induce undue accident avoidance. First, the
defendant can avoid liability by exercising reasonable care. Sec-
ond, noncompensatory damages, like child support, may be nec-
essary to induce an ideal level of deterrence. Without these
damages, tortfeasors may underinvest on the assumption that
only a fraction of the persons affected by their negligence will
actually seek and recover damages. 133 To the extent that the
tortfeasors believe this, they are likely to reduce their accident
avoidance measures below the theoretically optimum level.
Noncompensatory damages can counteract this temptation. As
a result, noncompensatory damages may serve the risk-utility
goals of tort law.
A third rationale for accepting the consequences of a child's
support liability without proof of harm is implicitly provided by
the benefits rule. Under the benefits rule, plaintiffs can recover
damages that are not reduced to reflect the benefits conferred by
the tortious conduct. The deterrence imposed under the benefit
rule could, therefore, be greater than theoretically ideal because
the defendant will have an incentive to invest amounts in acci-
dent avoidance that are much greater than the net harm caused
by his tortious conduct. This risk is accepted because it is pref-
erable to the inequities that would result if the defendant were
allowed to reduce or defeat recovery. In effect, the victim is
allowed to discount the value of the unsought benefits. Similar
discounting of the benefits conferred by tortiously induced births
132. The fact that such carelessness may cause harm to the parents does not change
this analysis. The net harm caused to the parents should be reflected in their recovery. The
threat of this recovery will deter careless services. Any additional deterrence caused by
liability to an unharmed party (like the child) would create the risk of excessive investment
in accident avoidance.
133. Cf LANDES & POSNER, supra note 131, at 160 & n.12.
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is also appropriate because the long-term benefits to the child
and to society are speculative and because these long-term emo-
tional and financial benefits cannot be exchanged for the support
that the child needs in the short-term.
Fourth, the marginal impact of this new cause of action on
provider activity is likely to be insignificant. No floodgates of
litigation will be opened. All disputes that would be candidates
for this new cause of action already expose health care providers
to the risk of wrongful birth liability. Because backup support
actions will require proof that the child is likely to have unmet
support needs, the viable cases for backup support will consti-
tute only a subset of the wrongful birth cases.
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, any efficiency analysis
must consider how these child support awards will be spent.
The presence or absence of harm to the child from birth itself is
not the only relevant factor. For both humanitarian and utilita-
rian reasons, a society should adequately support its children.
Only by doing so can society offer each child some threshold
amount of opportunity, security, and welfare. Children require
an investment of time, affection, and money to realize their
potential for a productive and fulfilling life. That investment is
likely to pay a substantial return. The greater the child's need,
the more likely that the return on a tortfeasor's support pay-
ments will exceed the societal benefits expected if the funds were
left in the hands of the tortfeasors and their patients. In that
event, cost shifting is socially beneficial in addition to being fair.
4. The Choice Between Tortfeasor Assistance and Charity
The harder question is not whether backup support is
socially desirable, but rather who should pay that cost. Under
current law either the children and their siblings bear the cost in
the form of inadequate support or else the cost is absorbed by
public and private charities.1 34 In my view, the tortfeasor's lia-
134. See Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822, 824-30 (Fla. 1984) (Ehrlich, J., dissent-
ing) (father out of work and family on welfare); Mears v. Alhadeff, 451 N.Y.S.2d 133, 134
(App. Div. 1982) (unwed mother on welfare after unsuccessful abortion); see also Viccaro
v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 13 (Mass. 1990) (the Massachusetts Supreme Court hinted that
it would impose support responsibilities if the affected child became a public ward). Con-
ceivably, an argument could be made for rejecting these claims and thereby encouraging
patients to obtain their own health insurance for their future children. But this argument
overlooks the possibility that child support assistance may be necessary for nonmedical
costs as well. No insurance pool exists for unanticipated child support costs. Even as to
medical costs, an argument can be made that it is unfair to the parents and others in their
1992]
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bility ought to precede that of the community and the children.
The defendant's misconduct caused the birth of this child. As a
result, it is inappropriate for the defendant to wash his hands of
responsibility by claiming that his antisocial conduct conferred
unsought benefits on the community.
Government funding would, however, offer its own advan-
tages. Public assistance would avoid the risk of overdeterrence
and keep the prices for these medical services down. In addi-
tion, the government would probably deliver these supplemental
funds at lower administrative costs than would be incurred if
children were encouraged to seek these funds through lawsuits.
But governmental assistance is likely to provide these chil-
dren with only minimal subsistence. It is unfair to limit the chil-
dren born because of third-party negligence to meager public
assistance, and to subject them to the possible stigma and humil-
iation associated with welfare, when the tortfeasor responsible
for the child's predicament is able to contribute toward the
child's support. If taxpayer funds are to be spent, they should be
used to improve access to medical services, like fertility services
and prenatal care, prices for which might be raised by child sup-
port liability. This will address the access problem in those con-
texts that present it most poignantly, while continuing to pass
the true costs of these services on to the patients who use them
and the physicians who provide them.
D. Policy Summary
As a matter of fairness, the tortfeasor's culpability and his
causal responsibility for the birth of a new and dependent
human being justify the imposition of a duty to provide backup
child support. Because this action would not base relief on proof
of harm, it would not directly advance the traditional tort goal
of compensating for such harm. It would, however, serve socie-
tal goals of assuring adequate support for the affected children.
In doing so, it would spread the costs of this support on the
providers and users of the medical services at issue.
The desirability of the resulting cost increases and possible
changes in provider behavior is more difficult to assess. The risk
insurance pool to require them to pay for these costs, regardless of the transaction cost
differential. Furthermore, the risk of negligence, such as a faulty vasectomy or amni-
ocentesis, is simply too remote to realistically result in the purchase of additional health
insurance coverage, given the many more immediate factors that determine whether a fam-
ily is covered by health insurance and the extent of that coverage.
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of undesirable changes in the treatment of poor patients or in the
costs and availability of some services is genuine. On balance,
these risks seem tolerable because there are several reasons to
doubt that excessive deterrence will result. Furthermore, the
social benefits from providing these resources to the resulting
children are likely to be significant. If so, the ultimate policy
question is whether tortfeasors or taxpayers should fund this
supplemental child support. In my view, the tortfeasor is the
better choice.
A tort-based action for child support holds the promise of
serving the important societal objective of providing adequate
care for children while avoiding the controversial issues that
doomed wrongful life actions sounding in tort. The support
action avoids the comparison between handicapped life and non-
existence and, unlike wrongful life actions, focuses the courts
and the parties on the task of helping the child fulfill his poten-
tial. At the same time, the support action will help families stay
together and reinforce provider respect for parental choices.
V. CONCLUSION
Children have a strong normative claim against individuals
whose misconduct leads to their birth. When their families are
unable to provide adequate support, resort to the tortfeasor for
backup support is a fair reconciliation of the respective rights of
the child, the parents, and the tortfeasor. Thus far, both legal
and methodological barriers have precluded scholarly or judicial
consideration of this claim. The methodological obstacles have
arisen because all of us have treated these claims exclusively as
tort claims. This compartmentalization made it difficult to see
the place of these actions at the borders of tort and family law.
It also created legal obstacles because the characterization of the
claims as tort claims subjected them to tort requirements that
were il-suited to do justice when a human life results from a
tort.
Nevertheless, many of the raw materials needed to build the
necessary bridge between tort and family law are already in
place. Existing legal doctrines, such as the tort rules that impose
a duty to rescue on tortfeasors who have a special relationship
with the plaintiff, are consistent with this new cause of action.
So, too, are family law precedents for imposing child support
responsibility on men who consent to insemination, induce a
woman to forego abortion or adoption, or misrepresent their
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paternity to a child. Indeed, modifications of either rescue doc-
trine, the tort benefits rule, or wrongful birth doctrine could be
used as alternative avenues for filling the gap between tort and
family law. But each has problems that render it inferior to
direct acknowledgement of a new tort-based action for child
support.
The strongest cases for imposition of an obligation of
backup support will display the following elements: (1) tortious
interference with the procreative rights of the parents; (2) the
foreseeable birth of a child who would not otherwise have been
born; and (3) the inability of the legal parents to provide ade-
quately for the child's ordinary or extraordinary support needs
without requiring inequitable sacrifices by other family mem-
bers. Where these factors exist, backup support liability is
appropriate unless other policy objections outweigh the norma-
tive claim.
To be sure, this new cause of action raises a number of pol-
icy issues. Many have been discussed here, and others will
surely surface as the idea of a tort-based claim is debated. Con-
cerns about the probable impact of this obligation on provider
behavior and about the implications of unbundling the tradi-
tional package of parental roles, in particular, raise legitimate
questions about the ultimate desirability of the action. At this
preliminary stage of the discourse, however, the advantages of
this claim appear to outweigh the potential disadvantages.
In addition, this proposal invites follow-up questions about
how this action would be implemented. Questions such as
whether to consider collateral sources of support (like health
insurance), whether to use lump-sum awards, and how to set the
appropriate level of support must await another day. More
voices will need to be heard on both the policy and doctrinal
questions before final conclusions can be drawn.
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